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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN TRANS-
BORDER PERSPECTIVE: TOWARD A MORE 
COSMOPOLITAN ORIENTATION 
Timothy Zick* 
Abstract: This Article examines the First Amendment’s critical trans-
border dimension—its application to speech, association, press, and reli-
gious activities that cross or occur beyond territorial borders. Judicial and 
scholarly analysis of this aspect of the First Amendment has been limited, 
at least as compared to consideration of more domestic or purely local 
concerns. This Article identifies two basic orientations with respect to the 
First Amendment—the provincial and the cosmopolitan. The provincial 
orientation, which is the traditional account, generally views the First 
Amendment rather narrowly—i.e., as a collection of local liberties or a set 
of limitations on domestic governance. First Amendment provincialism 
does not fully embrace or protect trans-border speech, press, and religious 
activities; it views certain foreign ideas, influences, and ideologies with sus-
picion or hostility; and it envisions a rather minimal extraterritorial do-
main. First Amendment cosmopolitanism, which this Article offers as an 
alternative orientation, takes a more global perspective. It embraces and 
protects cross-border exchange and information flow and preserves citi-
zens’ speech and other First Amendment interests at home and abroad. At 
the same time, it respects foreign expressive and religious cultures and ex-
pands the First Amendment’s extraterritorial domain. The Article cri-
tiques provincialism on various grounds. It offers a normative defense of 
First Amendment cosmopolitanism that is both consistent with traditional 
First Amendment principles and better suited to twenty-first century con-
ditions and concerns. The Article demonstrates how a more cosmopolitan 
approach would concretely affect trans-border speech, association, press, 
and religious liberties. 
Introduction 
 In its 2010 decision Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld a federal law that criminalizes citizens’ peaceful 
political speech when it is “coordinated” with organizations that have 
been designated by the U.S. State Department as “foreign terrorist or-
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ganizations.”1 The Court reasoned that (1) Congress and the executive 
could punish such “material support” to terrorist groups because, inso-
far as such organizations are concerned, words and weapons are fungi-
ble commodities; (2) providing these organizations with knowledge 
about international law and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms 
could backfire; and (3) speaking to or on behalf of the groups would 
only serve to legitimize them.2 As written, the law in question is broad 
enough to prohibit providing editorial space to the designated organi-
zations’ leaders in U.S. publications, collaborating with them on peace-
building efforts in places like Afghanistan, and even filing an amicus 
brief on their behalf in U.S. and other courts.3 Under this law, it makes 
no difference whether the citizen intends to further the terrorist ends 
of the designated foreign organization or seeks only to encourage 
peaceful dialogue. The Court was careful to note that its decision did 
not suggest that domestic terrorist organizations could be similarly 
treated.4 Nevertheless, although the Court acknowledged that the law 
was a content-based regulation of citizens’ peaceful political speech 
subject to heightened scrutiny, it upheld the law owing primarily to the 
foreign affairs and national security concerns expressed, if not proven, 
by Congress and the executive.5 The material support law now stands 
alone as the only content-based measure upheld by a majority of the 
Supreme Court.6 
 Humanitarian Law Project is only the most recent precedent to treat 
First Amendment guarantees as rather provincial in the definitional 
sense that they are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with domestic 
governance and other local democratic concerns.7 Under Supreme 
Court and lower court precedents, most dating from the post-war and 
Cold War periods, U.S. citizens: (1) have only a limited First Amend-
ment right to receive and distribute foreign materials inside the United 
                                                                                                                      
1 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726, 2731 (2010). 
2 Id. at 2725–26. 
3 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2010). 
4 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2730. 
5 See id. 
6 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), which had upheld a content-based restric-
tion on electoral speech). In Burson v. Freeman, only a plurality of the Court upheld a con-
tent-based regulation of speech at election sites. 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). 
7 See 130 S. Ct. at 2726, 2731. Throughout this Article, the terms “provincial” and 
“cosmopolitan” are used in their ordinary dictionary senses. The terms, however, do have a 
normative aspect as well. In Part III, I argue that the First Amendment ought to be con-
ceptualized as a more cosmopolitan provision. 
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States,8 (2) may be denied personal access to foreign speakers for any 
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason,9 (3) have merely a First 
Amendment “freedom” under the Due Process Clause to travel abroad 
for the purpose of gathering information about foreign cultures,10 (4) 
are understood by some courts not to have any First Amendment right 
to send communications to audiences abroad consisting solely of al-
iens,11 (5) have only a limited right to associate with aliens located 
abroad,12 and (6) have no First Amendment right to access and distrib-
ute inside the United States propaganda materials disseminated by their 
government abroad.13 Moreover, no court has ever invalidated the Lo-
gan Act, a criminal statute dating from 1799 that bans citizens’ unau-
thorized communications with foreign regimes and their principals,14 
the ban on alien contributions in U.S. elections,15 or the federal re-
quirement that certain U.S. institutions obtain a license prior to sharing 
certain scientific and technical information with aliens working in the 
United States.16 Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, there 
is no clear and unambiguous precedent holding that communications 
or associations that cross borders are protected in any meaningful way. 
                                                                                                                     
 Further, if the First Amendment speaks at all beyond U.S. borders, 
it does so with only the faintest voice. The Supreme Court has assumed, 
without ever deciding, that U.S. citizens possess free speech rights 
 
8 See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987) (upholding limits on distribution of 
foreign political propaganda in the United States); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 
301, 305 (1965) (invalidating a prior restraint requiring a recipient of foreign propaganda 
to affirmatively request delivery). 
9 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972). 
10 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306–07 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965). 
11 See Robert D. Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and Information: First Amend-
ment Issues, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 863, 867 (1985) (questioning whether First Amend-
ment values extend to speech directed to aliens abroad). Compare Briggs & Stratton Corp. 
v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915, 916 (7th Cir. 1984) (assuming the Free Speech Clause covers 
such communications), and United States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(same), with Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 
1217 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The extent of First Amendment protection of speech accessible 
solely by those outside the United States is a difficult and, to some degree, unresolved 
issue.”), and Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 679–80 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (observing that not 
all speech published by citizens in foreign forums is covered by the First Amendment). 
12 DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 
Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
13 Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D. Iowa 1989). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006). 
15 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006). 
16 See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2 (2011) (stating that the release of technology or software to a 
foreign national in the United States may constitute a “deemed” export to the person’s 
home country). 
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abroad.17 Some courts have rejected the free speech claims of citizens 
who traveled abroad to serve as “human shields” as a protest against for-
eign wars.18 Moreover, courts have not clearly resolved whether the First 
Amendment protects a right to receive information while abroad.19 Al-
though the press seems generally to be viewed as an institutional domes-
tic watchdog, a few courts have suggested, again without expressly so 
holding, that U.S. reporters working abroad may have some limited First 
Amendment rights.20 
 As far as alien speakers and audiences are concerned, there ap-
pears to be little support for applying the First Amendment extraterri-
torially. In 1989, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held in DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for International Development 
that alien recipients of U.S. funds are not within the First Amendment’s 
zone of protection and hence lack standing to assert free speech and 
association claims.21 One district court has concluded that foreign na-
tionals subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court may be barred by judi-
cial order from petitioning foreign governments abroad.22 Further, lit-
tle consideration has been given to free exercise concerns affecting 
missionaries and other activists working abroad or to U.S. support for 
sectarian projects beyond our borders.23 No court has ever decided in 
any written opinion whether the Free Exercise Clause applies abroad. 
Only one court has held that the Establishment Clause applies to pro-
jects abroad that are funded by the United States.24 The Supreme 
Court has never adopted any position on these extraterritorial issues. 
 In general, courts and commentators have not treated trans-border 
activities as a distinct and significant aspect of the First Amendment. 
Many of the leading academic analyses date from the Cold War era.25 
                                                                                                                      
17 Haig, 453 U.S. at 308. 
18 See Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 604–05 (7th Cir. 2009). 
19 See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1217 (noting that the extent to which the First Amendment 
protects the right to receive information abroad is an open question). 
20 Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175–76 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 355 F.3d 697 
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1571–74 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
21 887 F.2d at 283–84. 
22 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 280, 287–88 (D.D.C. 
1984). 
23 But cf. J. Bruce Nichols, The Uneasy Alliance: Religion, Refugee Work, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy 8 (1988). 
24 Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 843 (2d Cir. 1991). 
25 See generally Kamenshine, supra note 11; Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Ny-
lon Curtain: America’s National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 719 
(1985); William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering 
Propaganda in the United States, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 530 (1966). 
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Not surprisingly, the conception of the First Amendment that emerged 
from that period was narrow and provincial. Despite globalization and 
the steady rise of Internet-based communication, many academics con-
tinue to interpret the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause in this 
manner.26 Although some commentators have argued that the First 
Amendment applies to certain cross-border activities or concerns, they 
have tended to rely upon traditional theories or justifications.27 But tra-
ditional free speech justifications, particularly those concerned with 
domestic self-governance, were designed to apply to speech by citizens 
located within the United States who are communicating with other citi-
zens inside the United States.28 Those justifications do not expressly 
contemplate a world in which speech and associations frequently tran-
scend territorial borders. Thus, we may need to reconsider traditional 
justifications in light of contemporary conditions, or to develop a sepa-
rate set of justifications relating to the First Amendment’s cross-border 
domain. The few commentators who have considered the extraterrito-
rial application of the Free Speech Clause have differed regarding who 
may benefit from its protections abroad and under what circumstances, 
and none have supported more than minimal coverage.29 Finally, some 
                                                                                                                      
26 See, e.g., Sharon E. Foster, Does the First Amendment Restrict Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Copyright Judgments and Arbitration Awards?, 10 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 361, 390 (1998) 
(“[F]ree speech in the United States . . . should be the focus of the Court’s concern.”); 
Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel Judgments 
in U.S. Courts, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1978, 2007 n.160 (1994) (arguing that the First Amend-
ment “has a limited role abroad”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 
42 Jurimetrics J. 261, 267 (2002) (arguing that Yahoo’s right to disseminate reprehensi-
ble ideas “is a national right and does not extend extra-territorially beyond the U.S. bor-
der”). 
27 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 765–77 (advocating robust judicial review 
of certain cross-border speech restrictions); Brad R. Roth, The First Amendment in the Foreign 
Affairs Realm: “Domesticating” the Restrictions on Citizen Participation, 2 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. 
L. Rev. 255, 276–77 (1993) (arguing that citizen speech that relates to foreign affairs de-
serves First Amendment protection); Molly S. Van Houweling, Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments, the First Amendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the Next Yahoo! v. LICRA, 24 Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 697, 714 (2003) (“The First Amendment should protect speech to foreign audi-
ences even if the amendment is concerned primarily with domestic self-government.”). 
28 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 
22–25 (1948) (discussing self-government in the “traditional American town meeting”). 
29 Compare Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After 
Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2073, 2076–77 (2005), with Kermit Roosevelt III, Guan-
tanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2017, 2066 (2005). 
Some commentators view the Constitution itself as a social compact with an extensive ex-
traterritorial reach. They would presumably support a more robust extraterritorial First 
Amendment. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual 
Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 11, 34 (1985). 
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commentators have challenged the notion that the Establishment 
Clause ought to apply with much force abroad.30 
 The provincial orientation with regard to First Amendment liber-
ties and restrictions is, to some extent, understandable. Many of the 
principal concerns relating to free speech, press, and religion are in-
deed purely domestic in nature.31 The First Amendment’s trans-border 
dimension, however, has become increasingly important. The United 
States is not now, and in fact has never been, a hermetically sealed po-
litical community. Today millions of Americans travel and live abroad.32 
Citizens and many resident aliens communicate with aliens abroad, ob-
tain information from sources located overseas, collaborate across bor-
ders, associate with aliens residing in the United States and abroad, 
protest in foreign nations, and report from foreign lands. Digitization 
has increased reliance upon cross-border speech and given rise to new 
forms of cross-border association. The speech of U.S. citizens now rou-
tinely crosses borders, and the speech of foreigners easily reaches our 
shores. As they long have, citizen-missionaries and other religious activ-
ists work and minister in places across the globe. 
 At the same time, U.S. power has steadily expanded outward and 
beyond our borders. U.S. aid policies, as well as more direct forms of 
regulation, often affect the expressive and religious liberties of citizens 
and aliens residing both at home and abroad. 
 Congress and the executive have responded to some degree to the-
se developments, and as a result, U.S. territorial borders are not the 
hard ideological barriers they were prior to the Cold War.33 Largely in 
response to economic and international pressures, the political branches 
have liberalized or repealed a variety of cross-border restrictions on im-
migration, trade, and other activities.34 As a result of these legislative 
changes and broader social changes, including globalization and digiti-
zation, the United States has become a less insular society. 
                                                                                                                      
30 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 
DePaul L. Rev. 1, 115–16 (2005) (questioning whether the Establishment Clause ought to 
apply with full force in foreign countries). 
31 See infra notes 46–186 and accompanying text. 
32 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-989, Wide Range of Emergency Ser-
vices Provided to American Citizens Overseas, but Improved Monitoring Is Needed 1 
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09989.pdf (noting that in 2008, the U.S. 
Department of State estimated that 64 million trips were taken overseas by U.S. citizens). 
33 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 728–34 (describing Cold War cross-
border speech and association restrictions). 
34 See generally Timothy Zick, The First Amendment and Territoriality: Free Speech at—and 
Beyond—Our Borders, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1543 (2010). 
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 Nonetheless, we still lack a coherent foundation for analyzing the 
First Amendment’s trans-border dimension. Although our social and 
political circumstances have changed dramatically since the Cold War 
ended, our understanding of the First Amendment’s trans-border di-
mension has remained largely unchanged for decades.35 First Amend-
ment provincialism is increasingly problematic as the Internet does not 
grant legal immunity to speech or association that transcends borders. 
Additionally, legislative and executive border liberalization is a matter of 
political grace subject to potential reversal in response to new threats. 
Borders may open and close with changes in presidential administra-
tions. As Humanitarian Law Project shows, particularly during times of 
foreign conflict and cross-border tensions, legislative and executive in-
terpretations of the First Amendment may collide with longstanding 
First Amendment principles.36 Although U.S. borders are more open to 
foreign persons and materials, many current statutes and administrative 
regulations contain restrictions on cross-border speech and associa-
tion.37 Moreover, although they are not explicitly enforced, traditional 
cross-border restrictions, including ideological immigration exclusions, 
have not been entirely eradicated.38 Though there may be fewer border 
seizures of protected materials today, cross-border speech may now be 
intercepted electronically.39 And, even though we may have fewer for-
eign travel restrictions, officials have developed ever-expanding watch 
lists and no-fly lists.40 
 The consequences of some of these restrictions are widely felt. De-
cisions like Humanitarian Law Project affect not only the ability of citizens 
at home to reach across borders, but also the thousands of citizens 
abroad working on peace-building efforts in places like Afghanistan. 
Restrictions on foreign travel can affect a wide range of educational, ar-
                                                                                                                      
35 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722–30 (upholding, under a strict scru-
tiny standard, restrictions on citizens’ speech to and association with foreign terrorist or-
ganizations). 
36 See id. at 2712–13. 
37 See Roth, supra note 27, at 268–80 (describing limitations on cross-border speech). 
38 See Zick, supra note 34, at 1551–57 (discussing past and present regulations affecting 
immigration, including legal restrictions based expressly upon speech or association). 
39 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, 
50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1881–1881g, 1812, 1885–1885c (West 2010); ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 
F.3d 644, 682 (6th Cir. 2007). For more on the First Amendment implications of FISA, see 
generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amend-
ment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 741 (2008). 
40 See Scott Shane, An American Abroad May Remain So Until He’s off the No-Fly List, N.Y. 
Times, June 16, 2010, at A6 (reporting on the plight of a citizen placed on the government 
no-fly list, which apparently consists of 8000 names). 
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tistic, and familial activities. Even in the digital era, many First Amend-
ment activities remain dependent upon face-to-face and other tangible 
forms of interaction. Moreover, federal officials working abroad need 
guidance regarding their extraterritorial obligations under the Estab-
lishment Clause and other First Amendment provisions. For example, 
U.S. aid agencies have recently sought legal guidance from the U.S. De-
partment of Justice regarding the extent to which the Establishment 
Clause applies to the funding of mosques and the administration of cer-
tain educational programs in Iraq and Afghanistan.41 
 This Article examines the existing jurisprudence and academic 
commentary regarding the First Amendment’s trans-border dimension. 
Part I discusses the treatment of cross-border and beyond-border 
speech, press, association, and religious liberties.42 As noted, the result-
ing conception of the First Amendment is provincial, in the sense that it 
views the First Amendment as a set of domestic constraints on domestic 
governance and grants only the most limited protection to trans-border 
expressive and religious activities. 
 Part II criticizes the provincial conception or orientation on vari-
ous grounds.43 First Amendment provincialism is the product of a 
flawed jurisprudential modality of quasi-recognition that has signifi-
cantly limited and devalued trans-border First Amendment liberties. 
Provincialism is based upon the existence of a stark foreign-domestic 
divide that ignores our history and does not comport with our social, 
legal, and constitutional realities. The provincial orientation validates 
and perpetuates a fear or wariness of foreign speech and ideas. Further, 
provincialism is rooted in traditional theories of constitutional rights 
and obligations that are narrow and territorially bounded. In sum, First 
Amendment provincialism is a dated conception that fails to appreciate 
the importance of trans-border liberties. 
 Part III proposes a more cosmopolitan conception of the First 
Amendment.44 In general, First Amendment cosmopolitanism looks 
outward and adopts a more global perspective with regard to expressive 
and religious liberties. It recognizes the declining salience of territorial 
borders insofar as expressive and religious liberties are concerned, and 
the need to facilitate and encourage trans-border political, artistic, ed-
ucational, and social exchange. First Amendment cosmopolitanism en-
                                                                                                                      
41 See Office of Inspector Gen., No. 9-000-09-009-P, Audit of USAID’s Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives, Audit Report 5–7 (2009). 
42 See infra notes 45–257 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 258–338 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 339–448 and accompanying text. 
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courages citizens to be active participants in global forums, requires 
that U.S. officials respect foreign expressive and religious cultures when 
regulating abroad, and extends some protections to aliens directly af-
fected by governmental restrictions on their ability to speak and associ-
ate abroad. This change in orientation is not radical, subversive, or 
threatening to U.S. interests. To the contrary, it is wholly consistent with 
core First Amendment values including the facilitation of free inquiry 
and information-sharing, freedom to participate in dialogue and de-
bate, governmental transparency, and self-governance in an increas-
ingly globalized world. It is also consistent with U.S. obligations under 
international agreements regarding freedom of movement, the free 
flow of information without regard to frontiers, freedom of the press, 
and freedom of belief. Part III concludes by proposing concrete steps 
for removing restrictions on cross-border inquiry and exchange and 
mapping the First Amendment’s extraterritorial domain. 
I. The Provincial First Amendment 
 This Part discusses the jurisprudential contours of the First 
Amendment’s trans-border dimension. It begins by examining judicial 
and academic analyses of various cross-border expressive and religious 
activities. These include receipt and dissemination of foreign materials, 
travel for expressive purposes, citizens’ speech directed to alien audi-
ences located abroad, expressive associations involving aliens, and the 
exercise of cross-border religious liberties. The Part then turns to an 
analysis of the First Amendment’s extraterritorial domain, which en-
compasses the exercise of expressive and religious liberties abroad. In 
general, courts and scholars have interpreted the First Amendment as a 
set of domestic constraints on domestic governance. Under this tradi-
tional provincial account, trans-border concerns are generally relegated 
to the periphery of the First Amendment. 
A. Cross-Border First Amendment Liberties 
 Supreme Court and lower court precedents discussed in this Sec-
tion indicate that citizens enjoy only limited cross-border expressive and 
religious liberties. Thus, they have (1) a right to receive foreign political 
propaganda that is addressed to them so long as it has made it into the 
hands of U.S. postal officials, (2) a limited right to distribute foreign 
political propaganda inside the United States, (3) no First Amendment 
right to travel abroad even for expressive purposes, (4) limited rights of 
access and distribution with regard to U.S. propaganda distributed 
abroad, (5) limited rights to speak to and associate with aliens located 
950 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:941 
abroad, and (6) limited cross-border free exercise rights.45 Under the 
provincial interpretation of the First Amendment, citizens are generally 
treated as passive recipients of foreign information who often need to 
be protected from foreign persons and influences—including their own 
government’s foreign propaganda messages. 
1. Cross-Border Receipt and Distribution of Foreign Materials 
 In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time that 
citizens have a First Amendment right to receive foreign speech.46 In 
Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Court held that the U.S. Postal Service 
could not condition receipt of communist political propaganda sent 
from abroad on the addressee’s filling out a reply card and affirmatively 
requesting delivery.47 The Court compared the statutory process to 
state licensing schemes, taxes, and other prior restraints that it had 
consistently invalidated.48 Given the nature of the restriction, Lamont 
was an easy case. The federal statute, which incidentally was the first 
ever invalidated by the Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds, 
was a presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint.49 
 Lamont was undoubtedly an important precedent insofar as cross-
border speech is concerned.50 This decision has not, however, spawned 
any movement toward recognizing robust cross-border speech and as-
sociation rights. In part, this is because the decision is subject to a pro-
vincial interpretation. The result seemed to turn more on the effect of 
the prior restraint on the U.S. postal stream than on the foreign source 
of the material.51 Indeed, one scholar has suggested that Lamont turns 
on certain unique institutional attributes of the U.S. Postal Service.52 In 
any event, the Court did not offer a positive or affirmative case for re-
ceipt of foreign ideas or materials. The majority did not explain what 
precisely justified recognition of a right to receive foreign-source politi-
                                                                                                                      
45 See infra notes 46–186 and accompanying text. 
46 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 306. 
49 See id. at 307. 
50 Murray L. Schwartz & James C.N. Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A 
Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621, 633–49 (1959) (noting 
that prior to Lamont, foreign materials deemed to be communist propaganda were fre-
quently seized or subjected to licensure and other domestic restrictions). 
51 See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 306–07. 
52 Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Of-
fice Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 Hastings L.J. 671, 724 (2007). 
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cal, cultural, or religious information.53 It did not mention any connec-
tion between foreign speech and domestic self-governance, nor did it 
appear to rest on the Holmesian notion that citizens had nothing to 
fear from foreign ideas or ideologies.54 The Court’s principal concern, 
aside from the noxious form of restraint, seemed to be that domestic 
recipients, and in particular persons in “sensitive positions,” might be 
deterred from accessing foreign materials if required to affirmatively 
request them.55 Thus, Lamont can be interpreted as a narrow decision 
that made no grand statement regarding the importance of cross-
border communication.56 Indeed, the fact that neither the majority nor 
dissenting opinions in the Court’s 2010 decision Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project even cited Lamont may suggest such an interpretation.57 
 The statute in Lamont, which limited receipt of foreign political 
propaganda, resurfaced two decades later in a case involving dissemina-
tion of such material within the United States. In 1987, the Supreme 
Court held in Meese v. Keene that the Foreign Agent Registration Act 
(FARA),58 an anti-Nazi enactment that requires any “agent of a foreign 
principal” residing within the United States to register with the Attor-
ney General and comply with certain registration, filing, and disclosure 
requirements prior to distributing foreign propaganda in the United 
States, does not violate the First Amendment.59 With regard to disclo-
                                                                                                                      
53 See John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and Foreign Relations, 
36 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 19 (1986) (“[T]here are no judicial statements about an unlimited 
governmental power to exclude information that originates outside the country, such as 
mail or electronic transmissions, including information important to religion.”). 
54 See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 305–07; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
55 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307. 
56 See id. (“We rest on the narrow ground that the addressee in order to receive his 
mail must request in writing that it be delivered.”). 
57 See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). Events sub-
sequent to Lamont provide additional support for the interpretation that the Court recog-
nized a relatively narrow First Amendment right. See Teague v. Reg’l Comm’r of Customs, 
404 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding similar regulations requiring addressees of 
publications originating in North Vietnam and China to obtain a license prior to receipt). 
Moreover, as the Court noted, its holding left undisturbed the substantial power U.S. offi-
cials had long possessed to search and seize materials at the nation’s borders. Lamont, 381 
U.S. at 307. From the 1960s to the 1980s foreign materials were frequently seized at the 
border or subjected to additional domestic restrictions based upon their content or origin. 
See generally Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 25 (discussing various cross-border restric-
tions). 
58 481 U.S. 465, 485 (1987); Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 611–621(2006). 
59 22 U.S.C. §§ 611(c)(1), 614(a)–(b). 
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sure, FARA provides that foreign “political propaganda” must be la-
beled such that it conveys the fact that the distributor is registered with 
the Attorney General under the statute and that registration does not 
indicate approval of the material by the U.S. government.60 Barry 
Keene, a California attorney and member of the state senate, sought to 
distribute three Canadian films identified by the Department of Justice 
as “political propaganda.”61 The subject of two of the films was acid 
rain; the other dealt with nuclear war.62 Keene argued that the registra-
tion and labeling scheme deterred or chilled his distribution of the 
films in the United States and adversely affected his personal, profes-
sional, and political reputations.63 
 The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that “propaganda” had 
two meanings, one pejorative and another more neutral meaning that 
includes any material distributed with the intent of influencing public 
opinion.64 The Court distinguished the statute invalidated in Lamont, 
which required that the foreign materials actually be detained until a 
recipient came forward to claim them.65 In contrast, the Court in Keene 
stated FARA “simply required the disseminators of such material to 
make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to 
evaluate the import of the propaganda.”66 The Court concluded that 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. As Congress explained, the regulatory scheme is intended to protect the national 
defense and internal security of the United States, and to inform the government and the 
people of the identity and associations of disseminators of political propaganda so that 
they may “appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and activi-
ties.” Id. § 611. 
61 Keene, 481 U.S. at 467. Under FARA, “political propaganda” includes material that 
is reasonably adapted to . . . influence a recipient or any section of the public 
within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, 
policies, or relations of a government or a foreign country or a foreign politi-
cal party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or 
promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions. 
22 U.S.C. § 611(j). It also includes material that 
advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or reli-
gious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or vio-
lence in any other American republic or the overthrow of any government or 
political subdivision of any other American republic by any means involving 
the use of force or violence. 
Id. 
62 Keene, 481 U.S. at 468. 
63 Id. at 473. 
64 Id. at 477–78. 
65 Id. at 480. 
66 Id. 
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there was no evidence that the label “political propaganda” had any 
chilling effect on distribution of foreign materials inside the United 
States.67 This drew a sharp rebuke from Justice Blackmun, joined in 
dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, who accused the majority of 
“ignoring the realities of public reaction to the designation.”68 The dis-
senters argued that the “legislative history of the Act indicates that 
Congress fully intended to discourage communications by foreign 
agents.”69 Just as the scheme invalidated in Lamont deterred recipients 
from coming forward to claim materials from abroad, the dissenters 
reasoned, the actual burden on speech flowing from the public’s per-
ception of the labeled material would deter distributors from commu-
nicating disfavored messages to U.S. audiences.70 
 Restrictions on the receipt and dissemination of foreign propa-
ganda are not limited to materials originating from alien sources. For 
more than five decades, federal laws and regulations have authorized 
the U.S. government to spend tax dollars to disseminate positive mes-
sages about America to international audiences.71 Although Congress 
has over time exempted certain materials and recipients, a federal ban 
on receipt and dissemination of international propaganda within the 
United States of America remains in effect today.72 The only reported 
decision addressing a First Amendment challenge to the statutory ban, 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa’s 1989 deci-
sion, Gartner v. U.S. Information Agency, held that members of the print 
press and a state senator were not entitled to make copies of interna-
tional propaganda materials made available to them at an agency of-
fice.73 Relying on Zemel v. Rusk, a 1965 Supreme Court decision involv-
ing limits on foreign travel, 74 the court concluded that the First 
Amendment did not grant citizens an “unrestrained right to gather in-
formation” about their government.75 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. at 484. 
68 Keene, 481 U.S. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 488–89. 
71 Smith-Mundt Act, ch. 36, § 501, 62 Stat. 6, 9 (1948) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1461 
(2006)). 
72 22 U.S.C. § 1461-1a. 
73 Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D. Iowa 1989). 
74 381 U.S. 1, 2 (1965). 
75 Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1189 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17). Efforts to force disclo-
sure of U.S. propaganda materials under freedom of information laws have also failed. See, 
e.g., Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 337 F. Supp. 2d 146, 168 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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 Although Lamont presented an opportunity to bring cross-border 
speech and association within the First Amendment’s core domain and 
to signal support for an international marketplace of ideas, the deci-
sion has not subsequently been interpreted this broadly.76 Indeed, cases 
like Keene and Humanitarian Law Project suggest that connections and 
collaborations between citizens in the United States and aliens abroad 
may be restricted in a manner that would plainly violate the First 
Amendment were they enforced with respect to purely domestic activi-
ties.77 The rejection of challenges to the longstanding ban on domestic 
dissemination of U.S. propaganda materials is further evidence that the 
provincial interpretation of the Free Speech Clause countenances re-
strictions on domestic access to political speech based in part on the 
material’s place of origin and its supposed dangerousness to the do-
mestic marketplace of ideas. 
2. Cross-Border Travel and the First Amendment 
 Of course, United States citizens need not and often do not wait 
passively for foreign information to reach them. In 2008, the most re-
cent year for which data are available, the U.S. Department of State es-
timated that U.S. citizens took 64 million overseas trips.78 In addition to 
business and recreational interests, citizens travel abroad to gather in-
formation about other cultures; to engage with foreigners in scholarly, 
religious, artistic, educational and other endeavors; and even to par-
ticipate in political protests.79 
 Historically, the State Department exercised unbridled discretion 
with regard to the issuance and revocation of passports.80 Applications 
for passports were frequently denied on ideological, associational, and 
even religious grounds.81 Current U.S. passport laws and regulations 
prohibit the denial or revocation of a passport on ideological, associa-
                                                                                                                      
76 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2708 (upholding a statute that makes 
it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign ter-
rorist organization”); Keene, 481 U.S. at 485 (rejecting First Amendment challenges to stat-
utes that required an “agent of a foreign principal” residing within the United States to 
register with the Attorney General and comply with certain registration, filing, and disclo-
sure requirements prior to distributing foreign propaganda in the United States). 
77 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2708; Keene, 481 U.S. at 485. 
78 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 32, at 1. 
79 See id.; see also Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir. 
2009) (applying the Free Speech Clause to a citizen’s protest in Iraq). 
80 Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 Foreign Aff. 1, 17–28 
(1956). 
81 Id. 
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tional, or religious grounds, although they continue to allow denial 
based upon broader national security interests.82 
 Notwithstanding the current statutory protection afforded to terri-
torial egress, the First Amendment itself has not been interpreted to 
protect any right to foreign travel. To be sure, the Court acknowledged 
the First Amendment aspects of foreign travel in its earliest cases ad-
dressing restrictions on egress. In 1958, the Court held in Kent v. Dulles 
that the Secretary of State lacked statutory authority to deny passports to 
Communists or others wishing to travel abroad to further Communist 
ideals or causes.83 Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court emphasized 
the strong connection between foreign travel, information-gathering, 
and association.84 Ultimately, however, the Court recognized only that 
the right to foreign travel was part of the liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.85 Similarly, in 1964 in Aptheker v. Sec-
retary of State, the Court invalidated a federal statute making it unlawful 
for a Communist Party member to apply for a U.S. passport.86 The 
Court again stated that citizens possess a Fifth Amendment interest in 
foreign travel and held that the liberty of cross-border movement could 
not be conditioned upon renunciation of one’s First Amendment right 
of political association.87 
 In 1965, the same year Lamont was decided, the Court decided Ze-
mel v. Rusk.88 Zemel held that an American citizen who sought to travel to 
Cuba “to satisfy [his] curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and to 
make [him] a better informed citizen” but whose passport application 
was denied had failed to state a First Amendment claim.89 With regard 
to the claim that the travel restriction violated Zemel’s free speech 
                                                                                                                      
82 See 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006) (“A passport may not be denied issuance, revoked, re-
stricted, or otherwise limited because of any speech, activity, belief, affiliation, or member-
ship, within or outside the United States, which, if held or conducted within the United 
States, would be protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.”); 22 C.F.R. § 51.60(c)(4) (2011) (permitting the Secretary of State to refuse to issue a 
passport where it is determined “that the applicant’s activities abroad are causing or are likely 
to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States”). 
83 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958). 
84 Id. at 125–30. 
85 Id. at 125. 
86 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964). 
87 Id. at 505–08. Although the Court has never addressed the issue, the same due proc-
ess protection would presumably apply to compelled renunciation of one’s religious beliefs 
or associations. 
88 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 1. 
89 Id. at 3, 4, 16. Zemel averred that he wished to acquaint himself with “the effects 
abroad of our Government’s policies, foreign and domestic, and with conditions abroad 
which might affect such policies.” Id. at 16. 
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rights, the Court said only this: “[W]e cannot accept the contention of 
appellant that it is a First Amendment right which is involved.”90 This 
was so even though the Court conceded that the travel restrictions re-
duced “the flow of information” concerning Cuba.91 It characterized 
the passport denial as “an inhibition of action” rather than expression 
and compared the foreign travel restriction to a prohibition on physical 
access to the White House.92 “The right to speak and publish,” said the 
Court, “does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather informa-
tion.”93 
 Three years later, in United States v. O’Brien, the Court announced a 
general rule that restrictions that are unrelated to the suppression of 
expression but that burden speech incidentally are subject to an inter-
mediate level of First Amendment scrutiny.94 In 1981, the Court indi-
cated in Haig v. Agee that this domestic rule did not apply to foreign trav-
el undertaken for expressive purposes or to expressive activities 
abroad.95 Agee’s U.S. passport was revoked while he was residing abroad 
on the ground that he had imperiled U.S. national security by revealing 
the names of undercover CIA operatives working in foreign nations and 
by protesting CIA programs and activities.96 The Court grudgingly as-
sumed that as a citizen Agee enjoyed some Free Speech Clause protec-
tion beyond U.S. borders.97 Although the record indicated that at least 
some of Agee’s disclosures were already a matter of public record, the 
Court nevertheless characterized his speech as an unprotected attempt 
to obstruct intelligence operations.98 Further, it characterized any inhi-
bition resulting from the passport revocation as affecting merely action 
rather than speech.99 Most importantly, the Court clarified that the Fifth 
Amendment “freedom to travel outside the United States” was far weaker 
than the “right to travel within the United States.”100 It stated that al-
though the right to domestic travel was considered “virtually unquali-
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. at 16. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 17. 
93 Id. 
94 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
95 453 U.S. 280, 310 (1981). 
96 Id. at 284. 
97 See id. at 308. 
98 Id. at 309. 
99 Id. 
100 See id. at 306. 
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fied,” the freedom to travel abroad was “no more than an aspect of ‘lib-
erty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”101 
 Thus, the seemingly close connection between foreign travel and 
First Amendment interests acknowledged in Kent and Aptheker was con-
siderably less clear after Zemel and Haig. According to the Court, the 
“freedom” to travel outside the United States for the purposes of gather-
ing information, participating in educational or cultural activities, or 
exercising one’s religious beliefs does not implicate any strong First 
Amendment interests.102 This means that insofar as the Constitution is 
concerned, so long as due process is afforded, a passport denial or revo-
cation would be deemed valid. Although lower courts applying these 
precedents have sometimes disagreed regarding the applicability of the 
First Amendment, they have routinely upheld foreign travel restric-
tions.103 In sum, if the First Amendment applies at all in this context, it 
is merely as a faint background principle. 
3. Cross-Border Speech Directed to Alien Audiences Abroad 
 Citizens’ speech crosses international borders by traditional means 
(letters, packages, and the like) and through more modern techno-
logical channels (such as websites, blogs, and emails). Suppose that a 
U.S. citizen sends a letter or an email to an alien living in France. Is this 
cross-border speech protected by the First Amendment? In 2006, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Yahoo! Inc. v. La 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, a case involving materials made 
available in France through a U.S.-based website, that “[t]he extent of 
First Amendment protection of speech accessible solely by those out-
side the United States is a difficult and, to some degree, unresolved is-
sue.”104 
 Courts have provided little useful guidance with respect to the 
scope of protection afforded to cross-border speech directed to alien 
audiences. A few courts have simply assumed without explanation that 
                                                                                                                      
101 Haig, 453 U.S. at 307 (quoting Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978)); cf. 
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (upholding restrictions on travel to Cuba on stat-
utory grounds). 
102 See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16–17. 
103 See Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that travel restrictions imposed under Cuban Asset Control Regulations did not 
implicate the First Amendment); Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1235–36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (applying intermediate scrutiny and rejecting a poster importer’s claim that Cuba 
travel restrictions violated the First Amendment). 
104 433 F.3d 1199, 1217 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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the Free Speech Clause applies in these circumstances.105 In 1986, in 
Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, the U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California was more explicit, holding in response to a challenge to 
content-based U.S. customs regulations that citizens’ communications 
directed to foreign audiences are protected by the Free Speech 
Clause.106 The court rejected the government’s argument that “when 
United States citizens direct their speech to foreign audiences, the gov-
ernment may regulate such speech on the basis of content.”107 It did not 
explain, however, whether or how protection for such communications 
was justified under traditional First Amendment justifications such as 
self-government, the search for truth in the marketplace of ideas, or 
speaker self-actualization. Instead, the court simply asserted that “in the 
absence of some overriding governmental interest such as national se-
curity, the First Amendment protects communications with foreign au-
diences to the same extent as communications within our borders.”108 
In so stating, it suggested that First Amendment protection was based 
upon the assumption that the entire world is a “First Amendment fo-
m
     
ru .”109 
 In contrast, notable First Amendment scholars have argued that in 
situations where the intended recipient is an alien located abroad, the 
Free Speech Clause has no force. William W. Van Alstyne has suggested 
that a hypothetical prohibition on citizen war propaganda directed to 
aliens abroad would likely not give rise to any cognizable free speech 
claim owing in part to the fact that “such speech is not addressed to our 
                                                                                                                 
105 See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1984) (assuming 
that application of export controls to an American company’s desire to respond to a ques-
tionnaire from an Arab trade group regarding its business dealings with Israel raised a 
justiciable First Amendment question); United States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d 516, 519–20 
(9th Cir. 1978) (applying the First Amendment to regulations that prohibited communica-
tion 
ithstanding that their target 
aud
 affairs powers authorized suppression of 
spe  foreign lands. Id. at 503 n.16. 
 find their way into this country and 
bec .” Id. 
of technical data by a U.S. company to a French company). 
106 Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 503 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d, 847 F.2d 
502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Times Newspapers Ltd. (of Gr. Brit.) v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 387 F. Supp. 189, 192 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (suggesting, in dicta, that foreign press with-
in the United States have First Amendment access rights notw
iences are primarily composed of aliens located abroad). 
107 Bullfrog Films, 646 F. Supp. at 503. The court specifically rejected the government’s 
contention that the federal government’s foreign
ech directed to
108 Id. at 502. 
109 See id. at 503 n.16 (rejecting the government’s claim that “the world at large is not a 
‘First Amendment forum’”). The court observed that “matters occurring abroad, e.g., gov-
ernment ‘news leaks’ to the foreign press, are likely to
ome a part of our domestic political debate
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public forum, to sear our consciences.”110 Robert Kamenshine has simi-
larly questioned whether one could “justify a concern over restrictions 
on the flow of information and ideas out of the country.”111 Kamen-
shine argued, in the context of export restrictions on scientific and 
technical information, that traditional First Amendment justifications 
do not extend to speech directed to a foreign audience comprising 
solely alien recipients.112 Specifically, he claimed that “[n]o first 
amendment self-governance interest exists in informing foreign nation-
als” of debates regarding U.S. politics and foreign policy, that 
“[a]ssisting foreign nationals to find truth . . . is not a first amendment 
goal,” and that the self-fulfillment or autonomy rationale “does not pro-
vide a persuasive basis for affording protection to the purely foreign dis-
semination of information.”113 Although Kamenshine specifically ad-
dressed restrictions on the cross-border flow of scientific and technical 
information from a U.S. corporation to a foreign audience, his concerns 
are not necessarily confined to that narrow context. Indeed, several 
scholars appear to take the position that the Free Speech Clause applies 
                                                                                                                     
only to domestic speakers’ communications to domestic audiences.114 
 Thus far we have considered speech that is intended to actually 
cross U.S. borders and reach foreign audiences located abroad. Cur-
rent U.S. laws and regulations, however, do not require that communi-
cations actually exit the United States to be considered exports.115 U.S. 
export controls provide that educational and research institutions that 
share scientific and technical information with certain foreign national 
employees are legally deemed to have exported the material to a foreign 
nation.116 Institutions must receive what is known as a “deemed export” 
 
110 Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at 540–41. 
111 Kamenshine, supra note 11, at 867. 
112 Id. at 867–73. 
113 Id. at 867–68. 
114 See Foster, supra note 26, at 390; Maltby, supra note 26, at 2007 n.160; Reidenberg, 
supra note 26, at 267. Commentators who have adopted a somewhat broader view of the 
First Amendment’s scope have either rested on broad suppositions or disagreed regarding 
the scope of traditional theories. See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 744 (arguing 
that certain restrictions on cross-border expression and association are inconsistent with 
self-government theories); Roth, supra note 27, at 257 (arguing that laws and regulations 
restricting cross-border exchange ought to be “domesticated” in order to facilitate citizen 
participation in foreign affairs); Van Houweling, supra note 27, at 714 (“The First Amend-
ment should protect speech to foreign audiences even if the amendment is concerned 
primarily with domestic self-government.”). 
115 See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2 (2011) (stating that the release of technology or software to a 
foreign national in the United States can constitute a “deemed” export to the person’s 
home country). 
116 See id. 
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license before sharing the covered information with certain foreign 
nationals.117 The license is apparently required owing to the concern 
that foreign nationals will export the sensitive information when they 
leave the United States or will share it with a foreign power while still in 
e U
the licensure scheme does not restrict 
                                                                                                                     
th nited States. 
 If the same exchange were to take place between two citizens resid-
ing in the United States, the general First Amendment rule that restric-
tions on sharing legal speech based upon anticipated unlawful use are 
typically invalid would certainly apply.118 Based on the foregoing discus-
sion, however, one might argue that the First Amendment does not ap-
ply to a restriction on speech directed to a “foreign” audience composed 
solely of alien recipients. No court has ever addressed this issue in a re-
ported decision. Nevertheless, one prominent commentator has taken a 
rather provincial approach to the deemed export rule. Cass Sunstein 
has argued that the rule does not offend what he called “Madisonian” 
free speech principles because 
domestic political discussion.119 
 Citizens are also expressly prohibited under U.S. law from contact-
ing certain foreign audiences. For example, the Logan Act of 1799 
prohibits any citizen, “wherever he may be,” from engaging in unau-
thorized “correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government 
or any officer or agent thereof” with the intention of influencing the 
foreign affairs of the United States.120 A citizen concerned about nu-
clear proliferation could thus technically be prosecuted and sent to 
prison for sending an email to the Kremlin urging Russian officials to 
resist U.S. efforts to place strategic missile defense systems in neighbor-
ing countries. Owing among other things to doubts about the constitu-
tional validity of the Logan Act, the threat of such prosecution is not 
particularly high.121 Under a provincial approach, however, the Free 
 
117 See id. 
118 See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (hold-
ing that a municipal ban on the posting of “for sale” or “sold” signs on homeowners’ prop-
erties, put in place to prevent so-called “white flight,” violated the First Amendment). 
119 Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 889, 905–12 
(1986). 
120 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006). 
121 At the moment, such prosecution is highly unlikely. Although no court has ever 
ruled on the Act’s constitutionality, one court has expressed doubts regarding its validity. 
See Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (remarking upon 
the vagueness of certain terms in the Act). As one commentator notes, the Act’s history 
“has been marked by sound and fury, but no actual enforcement.” Roth, supra note 27, at 
267. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 268 (1966) (noting the lack of prosecution under the Act). 
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Speech Clause would not seem to apply to the Logan Act and similar 
content-based speech restrictions. Thus, for example, Congress could 
conceivably enact a statute prohibiting communications by citizens to 
alien audiences abroad that advocate, encourage, or espouse terrorist 
t-based communications would satisfy this mixed audience con-
itio
pecifically to domestic governance 
or other local democratic concerns. 
. C
ttle First Amendment protection to these 
contacts and collaborations. 
                                                                                                                     
acts against the United States. 
 To be sure, the category of vulnerable cross-border speech under 
consideration may be quite small by comparison to the marketplace as a 
whole. Targeted emails and other narrowly directed cross-border com-
munications such as phone calls might be considered unprotected, as 
might certain “deemed” cross-border communications to foreign na-
tionals in the United States. Additionally, some scholars have suggested 
that the free speech calculus may be different where the audience con-
sists not solely of aliens but of a mixture of aliens and citizens.122 Many 
Interne
d n. 
 Nonetheless, it remains difficult to try to predict the consequences 
of applying this provincial approach to the category of cross-border 
speech targeting aliens alone. Such an interpretation of the Free Speech 
Clause may leave a substantial amount of citizens’ cross-border speech 
vulnerable to regulation or even outright suppression. Even those courts 
and commentators who would hold that the Free Speech Clause applies 
to such expression have not offered a substantive justification for pro-
tecting speech that does not relate s
4 ontacts and Associations Involving Aliens Located Abroad 
 U.S. citizens frequently reach across international borders to par-
ticipate in associations with aliens located abroad and invite aliens to 
come to the United States. These contacts continue to engender First 
Amendment controversies, including allegations of ideological exclu-
sion of alien visitors and criminalization of peaceful speech on behalf 
of certain foreign organizations.123 Influenced largely by the federal 
government’s immigration, national security, and foreign affairs con-
cerns, courts have granted li
 
122 See Kamenshine, supra note 11, at 873–75 (explaining that restrictions on speech to 
mixed audiences generally raise First Amendment concerns). 
123 See, e.g., Juan Forero, U.S. Denies Visa for Colombian Writer, Wash. Post, July 10, 2010, 
at A7 (explaining that prominent Colombian journalist Hollman Morris, who had planned 
to study at Harvard University, was ineligible for a U.S. student visa under the “terrorist 
activities” section of the USA Patriot Act). 
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 The principal Supreme Court precedent relating to ideological 
immigration exclusion is Kleindienst v. Mandel, which was decided in 
1972.124 In Mandel, a Belgian journalist and self-described “revolution-
ary Marxist” sought a visa to enter the United States for a limited pe-
riod in order to participate in academic conferences and discussions 
with American scholars.125 The visa application was denied—for ideo-
logical reasons according to the academics who issued the invitation, 
and for reasons relating to Mandel’s conduct on earlier trips to the 
United States according to the government.126 The Court first held that 
aliens have no cognizable First Amendment right to enter the United 
States for the purpose of speaking to or associating with American au-
diences.127 The Court acknowledged, however, that U.S. citizens have a 
First Amendment interest in hearing, face-to-face, the speech of foreign 
visitors whom they have invited to come to the United States.128 Accord-
ing to the Court, this was so whether or not technological means ex-
isted for remotely distributing the alien’s speech.129 
 As in Lamont, however, the Court in Mandel did not justify protec-
tion for the right at issue on the ground that interaction with aliens or 
receipt of foreign speech served any particular First Amendment val-
ues.130 Indeed, the Court strongly signaled that any First Amendment 
interest was rather weak and easily overridden. Rather than balance the 
audience’s interest in hearing the alien’s ideas in person against the 
government’s interest in denying the visa, Mandel held that the gov-
ernment needed only to provide a “facially legitimate and bona fide” 
reason for the exclusion.131 Once it did so, the Court indicated, courts 
were not authorized to look behind the government’s explanation.132 
 Mandel ’s “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard is a stranger 
to First Amendment doctrine, and commentators have decried it as in-
consistent with core speech and association values.133 Mandel places vir-
tually no constitutional burden on the government to justify excluding 
                                                                                                                      
124 408 U.S. 753, 758–59 (1972). 
125 Id. at 756. 
126 Id. at 758–59. 
127 Id. at 762; see United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 279 (1904) (up-
holding ideological exclusion of alien). 
128 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 763–64. 
129 Id. at 765 (emphasizing the “particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face 
debate, discussion and questioning”). 
130 See id. at 763–65. 
131 Id. at 769–70. 
132 Id. at 770. 
133 See, e.g., Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 750–51. 
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foreign scholars, activists, artists, and other speakers.134 One of the 
most important questions left open by the decision is whether the U.S. 
government may exclude an alien owing solely to ideological concerns. 
Notwithstanding a statutory prohibition on ideological immigration 
exclusions,135 the executive branch continues to claim that it may deny 
entry to aliens on any basis, including ideological, associational, and 
presumably even religious grounds.136 Such actions would undoubtedly 
violate the First Amendment in domestic contexts. 
 Contacts and relationships with aliens are restricted in other re-
spects as well. Travel restrictions, funding conditions, registration re-
quirements, national security laws, and other provisions may inhibit or 
suppress intimate and expressive associational activities involving for-
eign persons and organizations.137 Few cases have analyzed associa-
tional rights or interests in cross-border contexts. No law or regulation 
affecting such associations has ever been invalidated on First Amend-
ment grounds in any reported decision. 
 Some travel restrictions affect cross-border familial or intimate as-
sociations.138 No court has ever addressed whether a travel embargo 
implicates intimate association rights under the First Amendment. As 
noted above, the Supreme Court has indicated that restrictions on for-
eign travel do not generally give rise to First Amendment claims and 
that foreign travel is merely an aspect of “liberty” under the Due Proc-
                                                                                                                      
134 See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766–70. 
135 In 1990, Congress passed the Moynihan-Frank Amendment, Immigration Act of 
1990, which expressly prohibits the deportation or exclusion of noncitizens “because of 
the alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, 
statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States.” Act of Nov. 29, 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067–77 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1101, 1182 (West 2010)). The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
however, allows exclusion where an alien endorses or espouses terrorism. See USA PA-
TRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a)(1)(A), 115 Stat. 272, 345–46 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)). 
136 See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 52–59, Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 
573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-0826-CV). An appellate brief filed by the George W. 
Bush administration claimed that Congress may and indeed had constitutionally author-
ized the executive branch to exclude persons based solely upon ideology, beliefs, or mem-
berships. See id. Although the Obama administration has been urged to renounce and 
disclaim this authority, it has thus far refused to do so. John Schwartz, U.S. Is Urged to Lift 
Antiterror Ban on Foreign Scholars, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2009, at A19. 
137 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88–98 (1961) 
(upholding, against First Amendment and other constitutional challenges, a federal scheme 
requiring that the Communist Party register with the Attorney General). 
138 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing “intimate” asso-
ciational rights under the First Amendment). 
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ess Clause.139 Thus, it is not likely that any challenge to travel restric-
tions, economic embargoes, or other laws inhibiting cross-border inti-
mate associations would be successful. 
 On a few occasions, courts have adjudicated disputes regarding citi-
zens’ First Amendment rights to participate in expressive associations 
with foreign persons or entities. Although they have not dismissed such 
claims out of hand, courts have regarded the right to associate or col-
laborate with foreign persons and entities with considerable skepticism. 
In 1989 in DKT Memorial Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for International Development, 
for example, the D.C. Circuit rejected a claim by domestic non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that U.S. funding restrictions re-
garding population-planning services violated their right to associate 
with foreign organizations.140 The court first expressed doubt regarding 
any precedential support for the proposition that two organizations may 
claim a First Amendment right to associate.141 Although it characterized 
Lamont as recognizing a “right of Americans to maintain First Amend-
ment relationships with foreigners,” the court observed that the right to 
associate with nonresident aliens was not absolute.142 It rejected the 
claim that the funding restrictions at issue, which essentially bought up 
the market of foreign NGOs that might be willing to participate with 
domestic partners in abortion-related projects, interfered with any First 
Amendment right to associate with “fair-weather foreign associates.”143 
Rather than balance the interests in expressive association against the 
government’s foreign policy interests, the court relied on Mandel, which 
upheld the denial of an alien’s visa, as support for rejecting the associa-
tional claim.144 
 Similarly, in 1988 in Palestine Information Office v. Shultz (PIO ), the 
D.C. Circuit rejected a First Amendment associational claim and upheld 
the closure of a foreign mission under the Foreign Missions Act.145 In 
PIO, the State Department determined that the organization, which was 
registered under FARA as an agent of the Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO), was a “foreign mission” under the Act and that the 
national security interests of the United States required its immediate 
                                                                                                                      
139 Haig, 453 U.S. at 306. 
140 887 F.2d 275, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
141 Id. at 292. Political parties, NGOs, and other organizations can of course advance 
the rights of the individuals they represent. Cf. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign 
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982). 
142 DKT, 887 F.2d at 295. 
143 Id. at 294. 
144 Id. at 295. 
145 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301--4304 (2006); 853 F.2d 932, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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closure.146 The Department based its decision on “U.S. concern over 
terrorism committed and supported by individuals and organizations 
affiliated with the PLO, and as an expression of our overall policy con-
demning terrorism.”147 PIO challenged the closure on First Amend-
ment grounds. The D.C. Circuit emphasized that the Foreign Missions 
Act “operates in that subtle realm in which foreign policy matters brush 
up against rights of free speech and free expression.”148 
                                                                                                                     
 The court held that the closure of the foreign mission did not in-
fringe upon PIO members’ rights to free speech, association, or receipt 
of information.149 Nor, the court held, did it violate any right to associ-
ate with the PLO itself.150 It described the closure of the mission as 
merely “an incidental restriction” on members’ speech rights.151 The 
court characterized the act of representing a foreign mission as con-
duct rather than expression and held that the closure easily satisfied 
intermediate scrutiny.152 It relied on Zemel, a travel case, and Mandel, an 
immigration exclusion case, in concluding that PIO had only a minimal 
First Amendment interest in associating with a foreign entity.153 It also 
added that there was no “right to represent a foreign entity on American 
soil.”154 Finally, the court emphasized that the government had a sub-
stantial interest in conveying a message of disapproval of terrorism 
through closure of the PIO.155 
 Additionally, current federal laws and regulations prohibit the pro-
vision of funding or other forms of “material support” to groups the 
government has labeled “foreign terrorist organizations.”156 The Secre-
 
 
146 PIO, 853 F.2d at 934–35. 
147 Id. at 936. 
148 Id. at 935. 
149 Id. at 939–40. 
150 Id. at 939, 941 (reasoning that PIO members, who were U.S. citizens and resident 
aliens, remained free to disseminate information and advocacy materials in the U.S. and to 
associate with one another). 
151 Id. at 939. 
152 PIO, 853 F.2d. at 939–40. 
153 Id. at 941–42. 
154 Id. at 941. 
155 Id. at 942. In a concurrence, Judge Laurence H. Silberman disagreed that the mis-
sion closure imposed a merely “incidental” restriction on PIO’s speech and associational 
rights, especially in light of the fact that the closure required PIO to dispose of its assets 
and cease operating, thus depriving it of the very means it had used to communicate. Id. at 
945 (Silberman, J., concurring). He also rejected the majority’s conclusion that operating 
the mission was conduct, not speech; rather, he said, it was precisely PIO’s speech that the 
government sought to suppress. Id. at 946. 
156 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) §§ 302–303, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1189 (2006), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2010). Congress amended the AEDPA in the USA 
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tary of State is authorized to designate as “terrorist” any group (1) that 
is foreign, (2) that “engages in terrorist activity,” and (3) whose activi-
ties threaten “national security.”157 Once the Secretary designates a 
group as “terrorist,” it becomes a crime to “knowingly provide[] mate-
rial support or resources to” the group.158 Federal law defines “material 
support or resources” to include “service . . . training, expert advice or 
assistance . . . [and] personnel.”159 
 In Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court held that the ma-
terial assistance prohibition could be applied even to pure political 
speech, so long as it was “coordinated” with a designated foreign terror-
ist organization.160 Specifically, the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project 
wished to assist foreign organizations in bringing human rights com-
plaints at the United Nations, to engage in political advocacy in the 
United States and elsewhere on their behalf, and to offer their legal 
expertise in negotiating peace agreements.161 The Court held that ap-
plication of the material support provisions to these proposed speech 
activities did not violate the Free Speech Clause.162 It characterized the 
law as limiting only speech that is coordinated with a designated for-
eign terrorist organization, not any independent advocacy plaintiffs 
may wish to engage in on behalf of the foreign organizations.163 Ac-
cording to the Court, the material support provisions do not prohibit 
citizens from advocating independently on behalf of the designated 
organizations before the United Nations or other international bodies, 
                                                                                                                      
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956, 2339A, (West 2010)), and again in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(b), 118 Stat. 
3638, 3762–64 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A (West 2010)). 
157 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(III)–(VI) (defining “terrorist activity”); id. § 1189(a)(1) 
(criteria for designation); id. § 1189(d)(2) (defining “national security”). 
158 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1). 
159 Id. § 2339A(b)(1). The definition expressly excludes religious materials. Id. Several 
courts have held that the provision of material support, as defined in the statute, impli-
cates conduct rather than speech or expressive association. See, e.g., United States v. Chan-
dia, 514 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that material support provisions regulate 
conduct rather than protected association); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of 
State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1244–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that material support provisions 
regulate conduct rather than speech or association); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 
205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that government may regulate contribu-
tions to organizations that engage in lawful—but non-speech related—activities). 
160 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726. 
161 Id. at 2714. 
162 Id. at 2728–29. 
163 Id. at 2726. 
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nor do the provisions even prohibit them from becoming members of 
the designated organizations.164 
 The Court rejected the government’s argument that the material 
support provisions regulated conduct rather than speech.165 It charac-
terized the law as one that regulated speech based upon its content.166 
As such, the law presumably had to survive the strictest form of judicial 
scrutiny. The Court held that the government’s interest in combating 
terrorism was “an urgent objective of the highest order.”167 It deferred 
substantially to Congress’s judgment that any form of support, including 
speech, would further the violent goals of the designated foreign terror-
ist organizations.168 The Court reasoned that material assistance in the 
form of advocacy and other speech “frees up other resources within the 
organization that may be put to violent ends.”169 Moreover, it concluded 
that speech on behalf of the designated organizations “helps lend le-
gitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for 
those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of 
which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”170 Finally, the Court accepted 
Congress’s determination that limiting speech and advocacy coordi-
nated with foreign terrorist organizations was necessary to sustain and 
support relationships with U.S. allies abroad.171 The Court characterized 
deference to the policy determinations of the legislative and executive 
branches as particularly appropriate in light of the “acute foreign pol-
icy” and national security concerns addressed by the material support 
provisions.172 
 With regard to the specific activities plaintiffs intended to engage 
in, the Court held that Congress could conclude that training members 
of foreign terrorist organizations on how to use humanitarian and in-
ternational law to peacefully resolve disputes could assist those organi-
zations in promoting terrorism by, among other things, “lulling oppo-
nents into complacency.”173 The Court also reasoned that foreign ter-
                                                                                                                      
164 Id. at 2723. 
165 Id. 
166 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 2725. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. Of course, the same conclusion obviously applies to all independent speech on 
behalf of the designated organizations. 
171 See id. at 2726–27 (noting that Turkey and other allies might “react sharply” to 
Americans furnishing material support to certain foreign groups). 
172 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727. 
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rorist organizations might use their knowledge of the structures of the 
international legal system “to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.”174 
Similarly, the Court concluded that teaching members of foreign ter-
rorist organizations how to petition international relief organizations, 
and engaging in political advocacy on their behalf, might further the 
violent goals of the terrorist organizations.175 
 The Court also rejected claims that the material support provisions 
violated citizens’ right to associate with foreign organizations.176 The 
Court explained that the law did not prohibit or otherwise regulate cit-
izens’ membership in the designated foreign terrorist organizations, 
but only the act of providing material support to such organizations.177 
In any event, the Court held that any burden on plaintiffs’ freedom of 
association was justified because Congress deemed such burdens neces-
sary to further national security and foreign affairs interests.178 
 The Humanitarian Law Project Court held that application of the 
material support provisions to plaintiffs’ proposed speech activities 
served a compelling objective and was necessary to curb the terrorist 
activities of designated foreign terrorist organizations.179 The Court 
also pointed out, though, that its decision should not be read to suggest 
that a similar prohibition on assistance to domestic organizations would 
necessarily satisfy the requirements of the Free Speech Clause.180 In-
deed, the decision seemed to turn largely on the fact that citizens had 
associated with foreign persons and entities the federal government 
had deemed off limits. The logic of the Court’s arguments—that weap-
ons and words are fungible, that speech that legitimizes foreign terror-
ist organizations can be criminalized, and that citizens’ speech can be 
suppressed in the interest of appeasing our allies abroad—is incom-
patible with domestic Free Speech Clause principles and doctrines. The 
Humanitarian Law Project decision places in jeopardy a wide range of 
exchanges and interactions between citizens, both at home and abroad, 
and aliens that the U.S. government has designated as dangerous to 
national security. Journalists, aid workers, humanitarian relief workers, 
and even lawyers must now be careful not to coordinate their speech 
with such persons. 
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 The relatively few courts to have considered the matter have held 
that citizens and permanent U.S. residents have a limited, perhaps even 
de minimis, First Amendment interest in relating to and associating 
with foreign entities and organizations.181 In the course of rejecting 
cross-border speech and associational claims, courts have questioned 
the existence of a right to associate with aliens abroad, sometimes char-
acterized associations with aliens abroad as conduct rather than expres-
sion, and relied upon travel and immigration exclusion precedents in 
upholding restrictions on cross-border contacts. 
5. Free Exercise of Religion Across Borders 
 Courts have had few opportunities to consider Free Exercise Clause 
claims arising from restrictions on cross-border activities and communi-
cations.182 Such claims would likely involve either foreign travel— dis-
cussed earlier—or the distribution of religious materials. 
 With regard to travel restrictions, Zemel and current free exercise 
doctrine strongly suggest that an allegation that a travel embargo inter-
feres with the desire to minister or practice one’s religion abroad would 
not state a First Amendment claim.183 There is only one reported case 
involving the application of U.S. export laws to religious materials. In 
1970, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decided Welch 
v. Kennedy, a case in which a Quaker claimed that enforcement of a 
trade embargo affecting distribution of funds and materials to North 
and South Vietnam violated his free exercise rights.184 The distributor 
claimed that the government did not have the power to regulate the 
provision of humanitarian relief that is motivated by religious con-
science.185 The district court assumed that the Free Exercise Clause ap-
plied to the cross-border distribution of religiously motivated humani-
tarian aid, but dismissed the claim on the ground that the trade laws 
imposed only an incidental burden on religious practices and beliefs.186 
                                                                                                                      
181 See DKT, 887 F.2d at 295 (acknowledging that Americans have a limited right “to 
maintain First Amendment relationships with foreigners”). 
182 See Mansfield, supra note 53, at 19 (noting the lack of precedents regarding the “un-
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 Although Welch did not address the issue, there may be reason to 
question whether the Free Exercise Clause even applies to the cross-
border provision of religious aid or materials. If, as some claim, the 
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is solely concerned with com-
munications that take place between U.S. speakers and audiences, then 
might a similar logic apply to religious expression and practice? Alter-
natively, it is possible that the free exercise guarantee is more universal 
than the speech guarantee, which has been interpreted as limited by 
self-governance, marketplace, and other pragmatic concerns. Neither 
courts nor commentators have ever developed any coherent basis for 
assessing or adjudicating cross-border free exercise concerns. 
B. Beyond-Border First Amendment Liberties 
 The First Amendment’s extraterritorial dimension has received 
relatively little judicial or academic attention. The First Amendment 
liberties enjoyed by citizens abroad—the right to speak, to receive 
speech, to publish information, to gather and report information from 
distant locations, and to practice their religious beliefs—are not neces-
sarily as robust as citizens likely assume.187 Further, whether U.S. tax-
payers are entitled to the benefit of the anti-establishment principle 
abroad is a close question and one of increasing delicacy and impor-
tance.188 Finally, there appears to be little support for extending any 
First Amendment rights to aliens located beyond U.S. shores. Like its 
cross-border dimension, the First Amendment’s extraterritorial dimen-
sion is largely underdeveloped. The structure and logic that presently 
exist are distinctly provincial in character. The central supposition is 
that the First Amendment is a set of domestic guarantees limiting do-
mestic governance. 
1. Citizens’ Speech and Press Activities Abroad 
 Remarkably, whether U.S. citizens are protected by the Free Speech 
Clause when they engage in speech activities abroad remains an unre-
solved issue.189 As noted earlier, in Haig v. Agee, the Supreme Court as-
sumed for the sake of argument that the First Amendment applied to at 
                                                                                                                      
187 See infra notes 189–215 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra notes 238–253 and accompanying text. 
189 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 280, 287 
(D.D.C. 1984) (noting that it is not clear “whether even American citizens are protected 
specifically by the First Amendment with respect to their activities abroad”). 
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least some citizen speech that is subject to U.S. laws and regulations be-
yond U.S. territorial borders.190 The Court has never revisited the issue. 
 A few lower courts have likewise assumed that the First Amend-
ment applies where the federal government seeks to restrict the speech 
of U.S. citizens, including soldiers, located abroad.191 In some recent 
cases, citizens have unsuccessfully tested the reach of the Free Speech 
Clause by traveling abroad to serve as “human shields” as a form of pro-
test against U.S. involvement in foreign wars and conflicts.192 Like the 
cases involving the First Amendment’s applicability to cross-border ex-
pression, these decisions more or less assumed that the Free Speech 
Clause applies abroad.193 The courts did not carefully analyze or pro-
vide a rationale for extraterritorial application.194 
 Other courts, in contrast, have suggested that the Free Speech 
Clause does not automatically apply to citizens’ speech activities 
abroad. In 1989, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois in Desai v. Hersh concluded that speech deliberately published 
or republished abroad by U.S. citizens may not be protected by the First 
Amendment.195 The court stated that “first amendment protections do 
not apply to all extraterritorial publications by persons under the pro-
tections of the Constitution.”196 
 Desai involved an Indian citizen who brought a defamation suit in 
U.S. federal court against an American author, Seymour Hersh, who 
had written a book about U.S. foreign policy during the Nixon Admini-
                                                                                                                      
190 Haig, 453 U.S. at 308. 
191 See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331–33 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (applying First 
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192 See Clancy, 559 F.3d at 605 (holding that sanctions imposed for travel to Iraq in vio-
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First Amendment standards). 
193 See Clancy, 559 F.3d at 605; Karpova, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 473–74. 
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195 719 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
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stration.197 The book was published in both India and the United States, 
and the plaintiff sought recovery under both Indian and U.S. defama-
tion law.198 One of the issues was whether the court could apply Indian 
defamation law, which is less protective than First Amendment defama-
tion doctrine, to speech that is distributed and received abroad.199 The 
court noted that: 
Had defendant written a book and published it solely in India 
concerning plaintiff’s activities as a public official in the gov-
ernment of India, but minimally related to a matter of public 
concern in [the United States], the need for protection of 
first amendment interests would be greatly lessened, if not en-
tirely absent.200 
This was so, it reasoned, because the First Amendment “shields the ac-
tions of speakers for the benefit of their audience.”201 
 In other words, the court reasoned that where the speech or pub-
lication does not affect the free flow of information inside the United 
States, the First Amendment does not apply.202 Moreover, the court also 
held that if the defendant had “intentionally published the speech in 
the foreign country in a manner sufficient to indicate abandonment of 
first amendment protection,” the First Amendment would not apply.203 
Ultimately, the court acknowledged that failing to grant First Amend-
ment protection to speech published abroad might chill speech both 
inside the United States and abroad.204 It noted: “Our world is shrink-
ing every day as a result of improvements in mass communications and 
travel.”205 Nevertheless, the court was not willing to provide automatic 
protection to citizens’ speech deliberately published abroad.206 
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199 Id. at 675. 
200 Id. at 676. 
201 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 676. 
202 See id. at 678 (holding that application of the First Amendment to speech published 
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204 Id. at 676–77. 
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state legislatures, and Congress with respect to libel judgments obtained in foreign courts. 
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 It is also not clear that U.S. citizens located abroad have a First 
Amendment right to receive information from either citizens at home 
or aliens abroad. As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit stated in its Yahoo! 
decision that “[t]he extent of First Amendment protection of speech 
accessible solely by those outside the United States is a difficult and, to 
some degree, unresolved issue.”207 Yahoo! raised the question whether 
enforcement of a French court’s judgment purporting to limit access to 
the speech of an American company in foreign locations violated the 
First Amendment rights of the recipients.208 The court did not clarify 
whether the foreign audience at issue consisted solely of aliens or a 
mixture of aliens and citizens. It merely observed that insofar as it re-
quired some restriction on access to the material in question, the 
French court’s order might require a determination “whether the First 
Amendment has extraterritorial application.”209 Ultimately, the deci-
sion did not address whether U.S. citizens or aliens located abroad have 
a First Amendment right to receive information that originates within 
the United States.210 
 The issue of extraterritorial press rights has also arisen on various 
occasions, most recently in connection with the strict limitations im-
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ported non-recognition of foreign libel judgments that do not meet American free speech 
standards. Compare Eric P. Enson, A Roadblock on the Detour Around the First Amendment: Is the 
Enforcement of English Libel Judgments in the United States Unconstitutional?, 21 Loy. L.A. Int’l 
& Comp. L.J. 159, 160 (1999) (“[U]nder the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and some views of the ‘state action’ doctrine, the American enforcement of English 
libel judgments is itself unconstitutional.”), with Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 
53 Emory L.J. 171, 172 (2004) (“Categorically refusing to enforce such Un-American 
Judgments is tantamount to imposing U.S. constitutional norms on foreign countries.”). 
207 Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1217. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1217–18. 
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posed on reporters at military tribunal proceedings at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba.211 In general, the First Amendment rights of the American 
press are no different from those enjoyed by other citizens.212 Ameri-
can journalists, however, play a uniquely important role in reporting on 
events that take place abroad. They frequently travel or are posted 
abroad to conduct research and report on location from foreign sites. 
 Suppose U.S. officials impose content-based or more general re-
strictions on American journalists’ access to information or reporting 
in foreign lands.213 Do the journalists have any First Amendment 
rights? Certain published opinions suggest that a plausible argument 
might be made, in an appropriate case, for enforcing press rights 
abroad; thus far, however, no court has ever accepted such an argument 
or actually enforced extraterritorial press rights.214 At present, nothing 
would seem to preclude the federal government from prohibiting the 
press from reporting on wartime activities, detention facilities, and 
other foreign activities.215 
                                                                                                                     
 In sum, the basic assumption articulated in some judicial decisions 
is that the First Amendment may limit the government’s power to di-
rectly regulate citizens’ speech or American press activities abroad. 
Courts, however, do not appear ever actually to have enforced citizens’ 
speech or press rights extraterritorially. Additionally, courts and com-
mentators have expressed some doubt regarding whether anyone has a 
right to receive speech abroad and whether the Free Speech Clause 
even applies to speech that does not concern an issue of public con-
cern within the United States and is deliberately published in foreign 
nations. 
 
211 Jeremy W. Peters, News Media Seek Loosening of the Pentagon’s Rules at Guantanamo, 
N.Y. Times, July 21, 2010, at A15. 
212 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905–06 (2010) (rejecting the proposition 
that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers). 
213 See Leo Shane III, Army Used Profiles to Reject Reports, Stars & Stripes (Mideast ed.), 
Aug. 29, 2009, at 1, 2 (reporting that the Pentagon used secret profiles of journalists’ work 
to influence coverage of the war in Afghanistan). 
214 See Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175–76 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 355 F.3d 697 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (declining publisher’s request to enjoin the Secretary of Defense from 
interfering with a plan to have correspondents accompany American troops during com-
bat in Afghanistan); Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (acknowledging that the “affirmative right to gather news, ideas and in-
formation” was implicated by Defense Department restrictions on coverage of Operation 
Desert Storm, but refusing to grant the journalists’ requested injunctive relief). 
215 See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 49, 66 
(2006) (“So far as existing case law is concerned, there appears to be nothing to prevent 
the Pentagon from eliminating on-scene coverage of military operations, detention facili-
ties, military hospitals, and other auxiliaries of war.”). 
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2. Speech by Aliens in the United States and Abroad 
 The First Amendment rights of aliens, whether resident in the 
United States or abroad, are not well settled. The Supreme Court and 
some lower courts have suggested that aliens may be deported from the 
United States for ideological or associational reasons, and the Court 
has held that aliens may not challenge their deportation on the ground 
that they have been singled out for their statements or associations.216 
Under these precedents, the First Amendment does not clearly pro-
hibit ideological deportation. 
 With regard to aliens located abroad, the Court held in Mandel 
that they have no cognizable First Amendment right to enter the Unit-
ed States.217 Although alien speakers and audiences residing abroad 
can be substantially and directly affected by U.S. regulations and poli-
cies, the Supreme Court has never decided whether the First Amend-
ment applies to any alien speech activity abroad.218 Courts and com-
mentators, however, have generally been skeptical that aliens located 
abroad enjoy free speech protections.219 Indeed, one commentator 
summarized what might be considered the prevailing provincial senti-
                                                                                                                      
216 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488–92 (1999) (hold-
ing that a person may not challenge deportation on grounds that he or she was selectively 
prosecuted based on otherwise protected speech). Compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 592 (1952) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to deportation), and Price v. 
U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878, 884 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting 
that Harisiades gives government nearly unlimited authority over immigration), with Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other 
grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (suggesting that Harisiades does not allow the government to deport 
aliens based on otherwise protected speech), and Parcham v. U.S. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 769 F.2d 1001, 1011 (4th Cir. 1985) (same). 
217 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762. 
218 See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592 (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a law pro-
viding for the deportation of communists); Williams, 194 U.S. at 290–91 (upholding the 
removal of an alien anarchist). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Court sug-
gested that the Free Speech Clause applies in at least some U.S. territories. See Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901) (suggesting that the First Amendment applied in both 
incorporated and unincorporated territories); id. at 294 (White, J., concurring) (noting 
that “general prohibitions in the Constitution” were “an absolute denial of all authority” to 
Congress to do certain things); see also Virgin Islands Elective Governor Act § 11, 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1561 (2006) (signaling congressional intent to extend Bill of Rights protections to resi-
dents of the Virgin Islands); Guam Elective Governor Act § 10, 48 U.S.C. § 1421b (2006) 
(extending protections of Bill of Rights to Guam). 
219 But see Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Bor-
ders, and Fundamental Law 99–100 (1996) (defending an approach that “extends con-
stitutional rights to aliens abroad only in those situations in which the United States claims 
an individual’s obedience to its commands on the basis of its legitimate authority”). 
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ment: “The First Amendment, designed by ‘We the People,’ for the 
people, has a limited role abroad.”220 
 As a textual matter, the First Amendment itself (“Congress shall 
make no law . . .”) contains neither a geographic limitation nor one 
defining its beneficiaries.221 It does contain some political membership 
(i.e., “the people”) language, but only in reference to the seemingly 
localized rights of assembly and petition.222 In any event, reliance on 
membership in the political community to determine the Constitu-
tion’s extraterritorial application has not garnered more than a plural-
ity of Supreme Court votes in other disputes involving extraterritorial 
application of the Bill of Rights.223 
 Neither courts nor commentators have relied on any supposed 
textual limitation with regard to aliens’ free speech rights. A few lower 
courts, however, have expressly rejected claims by alien speakers that 
they are entitled to First Amendment protections while abroad and not 
under U.S. custody or control. In its 1989 decision in DKT Memorial 
Fund, the D.C. Circuit held that foreign speakers lacked prudential 
standing to challenge a U.S. funding condition that prohibited them 
from using even their own private funds to discuss abortion.224 In a 
1984 decision, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the First Amend-
ment did not bar it from enforcing an order that foreign defendants 
under its jurisdiction were prohibited from speaking to or petitioning 
their own governments abroad.225 
 These decisions predate significant Supreme Court precedents re-
garding the extraterritorial application of the Constitution. In 1990 in 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a case actually on appeal when one of 
the aforementioned cases was decided, the Court held that certain 
Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to the search of an alien’s 
property in Mexico.226 Justice Kennedy, who provided the decisive vote, 
relied upon a functional and pragmatic approach to extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Fourth Amendment, under which the Court ultimately 
                                                                                                                      
220 Maltby, supra note 26, at 2007 n.160. 
221 See U.S. Const. amend. I. 
222 See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
223 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1990) (plurality opin-
ion) (relying on Fourth Amendment language limiting its protections to “the people”). 
But see id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting membership approach). 
224 887 F.2d at 283–85. 
225 604 F. Supp. at 287, 290. 
226 494 U.S. at 274–75. 
2011] The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective 977 
concluded that it was impracticable to apply the warrant requirement to 
searches of aliens’ property overseas.227 More recently, in its 2008 deci-
sion Boumediene v. Bush, the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus 
extended to alien detainees being held at U.S. facilities at Guantanamo 
Bay, a territory under the legal control of the United States but over 
which it does not exercise sovereignty.228 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy again applied a multi-factor pragmatic approach to determine 
the scope or domain of the habeas guarantee. The relevant factors in-
cluded the nature and degree of control the United States exercises 
over the territory in question, the importance of the writ itself, the status 
of the detainees, the location of the arrests and detentions, and any 
practical obstacles to administration of the writ.229 
 No court has yet addressed what, if any, effect Verdugo-Urquidez and 
Boumediene might have on the free speech rights of aliens located 
abroad. The commentators who have discussed the matter have dis-
agreed regarding the scope, substance, and proper justifications for 
extraterritorial application of the First Amendment’s expressive guar-
antees to aliens.230 
 Kermit Roosevelt has argued that although the Free Speech Clause 
might protect some communications between aliens and citizens, the 
First Amendment’s self-governance justification simply does not apply 
to alien-to-alien speech abroad.231 Further, Roosevelt claims that “it is 
hard to see why the Constitution would be concerned with the self-
actualization of aliens abroad.”232 In a response to Roosevelt, Gerald 
Neuman does not contest the limited relevance of self-government 
principles in the context of alien-to-alien communications.233 He also 
agrees that the First Amendment does not obligate the United States to 
                                                                                                                      
227 Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
228 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). 
229 Id. at 739, 758–59, 765. The D.C. Circuit, applying this test, recently held that the 
writ of habeas corpus does not extend to aliens being held at Bagram Air Force Base in 
Afghanistan. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
230 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 259, 287 (2009) (arguing that the extent of First Amendment protection 
abroad may depend on such factors as “where the speech originated, where its intended 
audience was, and the location of detention and trial”). Compare Neuman, supra note 29, at 
2082–83 (suggesting that some alien communications abroad may be protected by the First 
Amendment), with Roosevelt, supra note 29, at 2066 (expressing doubt that alien-to-alien 
communications abroad are protected under traditional First Amendment justifications). 
231 Roosevelt, supra note 29, at 2066. 
232 Id. 
233 Neuman, supra note 29, at 2082. 
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facilitate aliens’ self-actualization abroad.234 Neuman, however, is open 
to extending some narrow protection to alien communications abroad. 
In particular, he asks: “[I]s it so clear that no First Amendment con-
cerns are raised when the [U.S.] government reaches out to crush 
aliens’ self-actualization abroad?”235 Neuman posits that although not 
all free speech protections would apply to aliens abroad, foreign speak-
ers who are subject to U.S. detention and punishment for speech 
abroad, or who are taken into U.S. custody and prosecuted in the 
United States for their foreign communications, are entitled to some 
level of First Amendment protection.236 
 In sum, the few reported decisions and existing academic com-
mentary seem generally to be in agreement that expressive guarantees 
do not apply extraterritorially to aliens.237 This means that American 
officials can condition aliens’ receipt of benefits on waiver of First 
Amendment rights and that aliens in foreign territories do not enjoy 
any protections against suppression, censorship, or other restrictions 
on speech and association. It is not clear whether the pragmatic ap-
proach to constitutional domain adopted by the Supreme Court in cas-
es like Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene might affect this conclusion, and 
if so, to what extent. 
3. Extraterritorial Application of the Religion Clauses 
 The United States appropriates and spends substantial sums of 
money to support a variety of projects and missions abroad. Some of 
these projects involve direct or indirect funding of sectarian schools and 
other institutions.238 As the United States pursues its foreign policy ob-
jectives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world, Estab-
lishment Clause concerns will likely arise with increasing frequency. In 
addition, U.S. missionaries and religious organizations have long been 
active in foreign nations. Their activities may conflict with the policies 
and objectives of U.S. military and federal agencies working abroad. 
Given the importance of the relationship between foreign missions and 
U.S. officials, litigation seems unlikely. Nevertheless, in structuring their 
interactions and carrying out their missions, individuals and agencies 




237 See supra notes 216–236 and accompanying text. 
238 Office of Inspector Gen., supra note 41, at 5–7. 
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ought to know whether the Free Exercise Clause has any force beyond 
American shores. 
 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations declares matter-of-factly 
that “the right not to be subject to an establishment of religion [is] pro-
tected against infringement in the exercise of foreign relations power 
as in domestic affairs.”239 To date only two courts have considered 
whether the Establishment Clause applies abroad. In 1975, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dickson v. Ford dismissed an 
establishment claim challenging the appropriation of funds for emer-
gency military assistance to the state of Israel on the ground that it was 
a political question implicating the balance of power in the Middle 
East.240 In its 1991 decision Lamont v. Woods, however, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the merits and held that the 
Establishment Clause applies to U.S.-funded programs and facilities 
abroad.241 As the only precedent to have reached the merits on this is-
sue, Woods deserves close attention. 
 In Woods, taxpayers challenged U.S. grants to twenty foreign 
schools—eleven Israeli schools and nine schools affiliated with the Ro-
man Catholic Church—located in various U.S. territories and foreign 
countries that received grants under the American Schools and Hospi-
tals Abroad (ASHA) program authorized by the Foreign Assistance 
Act.242 The grants were made to individuals or groups inside the United 
States for the benefit of foreign schools. The U.S. sponsors were respon-
sible for transferring the funds to the schools abroad and had virtually 
no contact with the foreign affiliates.243 Agency guidance proscribed the 
use of ASHA grants to train persons for religious pursuits or to construct 
                                                                                                                      
239 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 721 & 
cmts. a, b & d (1987 & Supp. 2008). 
240 521 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). 
241 948 F.2d 825, 843 (2d Cir. 1991). 
242 The schools were located in the Philippines, Egypt, Jamaica, Micronesia, and South 
Korea. Id. at 828. The ASHA program authorizes the president to furnish assistance to 
schools outside the United States or sponsored by U.S. citizens and serving as study and 
demonstration centers for ideas and practices of the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 2174(a) 
(2006). The foreign affiliates are required to operate as “centers for American educational 
ideas and practices, with programs of study that reflect favorably on and increase under-
standing of the United States.” Final Program Criteria for Screening of Applications for 
Grants Made by American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) Program, 44 Fed. Reg. 
67,543, 67,544 (Nov. 26, 1979). 
243 Woods, 948 F.2d at 828. 
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buildings or other facilities intended for worship or religious instruc-
tion.244 
 The court in Woods noted that the Establishment Clause clearly 
applied to the ASHA grants to domestic recipients because the funding 
decision was made in the United States.245 Indeed, the court observed 
that “any alleged Establishment Clause violations in this case, if estab-
lished, would have occurred in the United States—i.e., at the time that 
appellants granted money to United States entities for the benefit of 
foreign sectarian institutions—and not abroad—i.e., at the time the 
money was received or expended.”246 The court concluded that the 
grants in question implicated the Establishment Clause’s extraterrito-
rial dimension because they only benefited foreign institutions.247 Us-
ing the analytical framework from Verdugo-Urquidez, the court examined 
the First Amendment’s text, the operation of the Establishment Clause 
domestically and abroad, the history of the Establishment Clause, the 
extent to which support for religion overseas relates to and benefits re-
ligious institutions in the United States, and policy considerations per-
taining to extraterritorial application of the anti-establishment princi-
ple.248 
 Having determined based on these considerations that the Estab-
lishment Clause applied, the court stated that the provision might nev-
ertheless function somewhat differently abroad.249 Specifically, the 
court suggested that the lower court take into account any special cir-
cumstances relating to the presence or functioning of religious institu-
tions in foreign countries.250 It explained, for instance, that U.S. agen-
cies would be entitled to show a “compelling reason” why, based on the 
local circumstances, the risks attendant to the funding of sectarian 
schools should be borne in some cases.251 
 At present, Woods is the only guidance U.S. aid officials and grant-
ees have with regard to the extraterritorial reach of the Establishment 
Clause. Although much of the analysis might be considered dictum and 
is not beyond reproach, the decision makes a plausible case for extend-
                                                                                                                      
244 Final Program Criteria for Screening of Applications for Grants Made by American 
Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) Program, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,544. 
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ing Establishment Clause protection overseas.252 It is an exception to 
the provincial thinking that has otherwise been applied in analyses of 
beyond-border First Amendment liberties. The decision has been criti-
cized, however, by some commentators who question whether its rea-
soning has been eroded by domestic jurisprudential developments and 
who contend that officials may be entitled to near-absolute foreign af-
fairs-type deference when funding sectarian programs abroad.253 
 Extraterritorial application of the Free Exercise Clause may be 
supported in part by the Supreme Court’s 1878 decision Reynolds v. 
United States, which held that the Free Exercise Clause applies in U.S. 
territories on the path to statehood.254 Nonetheless, neither Reynolds 
nor any other precedent explicitly addresses whether the Free Exercise 
Clause grants any enforceable rights to either citizens or aliens located 
abroad. With regard to citizens, at least, Reynolds points in the direction 
of more universal application.255 In addition, the pre-colonial history of 
religious persecution abroad may suggest that the Free Exercise Clause 
ought to protect citizens living and working abroad. 
 Still, there is nothing in Reynolds itself to indicate whether, for ex-
ample, a U.S. missionary located in the Sudan may bring a free exercise 
claim when ordered by U.S. military or other officials not to proselytize 
or minister in a certain area for fear of inciting religious hostility or for 
other reasons. Nor do any decisions or academic commentaries address 
whether aliens located abroad, including U.S. detainees, are entitled to 
free exercise rights or statutory religious freedom protections.256 Of 
course, as noted, national security and foreign affairs exigencies will 
often determine the scope of protection for religious free exercise in 
foreign territories. A religious mission dependent upon federal logisti-
cal and other support will be disinclined to assert any free exercise 
rights abroad, and pragmatic concerns might weigh heavily against 
granting free exercise rights to aliens in U.S. custody or under U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
252 For example, the Second Circuit in Woods treated certain U.S. territories, including 
the Philippines, as if they were located abroad rather than within U.S. territorial limits. Id. 
at 828. It also failed to clarify whether the situs of the funding was a crucial aspect of its 
decision—in other words, whether the same rationale would apply where funds are given 
directly to foreign recipients rather than U.S. sponsors. See id. at 834. 
253 E.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 30, at 116–17. 
254 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878). 
255 See id. 
256 Cf. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining to decide 
whether the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act applied extraterritorially to aliens 
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). 
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control.257 In sum, at this moment, there is no clear answer regarding 
whether the free exercise guarantee traverses territorial borders. 
II. Fundamental Problems with First Amendment Provincialism 
 Although the jurisprudential contours of the trans-border dimen-
sion are not fully developed, judicial decisions and academic commen-
tary generally locate trans-border liberties at the First Amendment’s dis-
tant periphery rather than near its core. Of course, many of the princi-
pal concerns relating to expressive and religious liberties are domestic 
in nature and do indeed relate to local democratic concerns. This, how-
ever, does not exhaust the First Amendment’s potential domain of in-
fluence. This Part argues that trans-border liberties have been devalued 
and consigned to the First Amendment’s periphery as a result of a 
flawed modality of provincial quasi-recognition. That modality, in turn, 
is based upon a supposed foreign-domestic divide that ignores American 
history and does not comport with present social, legal, and constitu-
tional realities. First Amendment provincialism validates and perpetu-
ates a fear or wariness of foreign persons, speech, contacts, ideas, and 
faiths. Further, it is based upon dated and static accounts of First 
Amendment theories and justifications. At a time when citizens and of-
ficials are increasingly engaging with the world, provincialism’s quasi-
recognition of the First Amendment’s trans-border dimension gives rise 
to troubling uncertainty regarding the rights of citizens and the obliga-
tions of U.S. officials when acting or regulating abroad. 
A. The Jurisprudence of Quasi-Recognition 
 As Part I demonstrates, courts and commentators have been reluc-
tant to recognize trans-border First Amendment liberties. In the courts, 
the First Amendment’s trans-border dimension has been defined pri-
marily by an interpretive methodology of quasi-recognition. This has 
created uncertainty with regard to the degree of protection, even with 
respect to citizens, of the exercise of trans-border First Amendment lib-
erties. In general, quasi-recognition entails the following: (1) a refusal or 
reluctance to expressly recognize, justify, and enforce trans-border First 
Amendment guarantees; (2) the devaluation of constitutional rights 
that are integral to trans-border speech and other expressive liberties; 
(3) an over-reliance upon the First Amendment’s speech-conduct dis-
                                                                                                                      
257 See Nichols, supra note 23, at 8 (noting that domestic and international law may be 
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tinction; (4) reflexive deference to foreign affairs and national security 
concerns; and (5) an unwarranted extension of the scope of plenary 
immigration powers and precedents. 
 As discussed in Part I, on many occasions courts have simply as-
sumed rather than expressly held that the First Amendment applies to 
trans-border speech, press, and religious activities. Thus, some courts 
have assumed or acknowledged the possibility that the First Amend-
ment might apply to the following activities: citizens’ right to hear for-
eign speakers in person, citizens’ speech directed solely to foreign au-
diences, citizens’ right to associate with foreign entities and persons, 
citizens’ right to send religious materials abroad, citizens’ right to speak 
and associate abroad, certain extraterritorial American press freedoms, 
foreign audiences’ receipt of information from U.S. distributors, and 
foreign press activities on U.S. soil.258 Courts and commentators, how-
ever, have not generally been willing to take the next step and formally 
recognize these liberties. 
 Although courts often strive to avoid constitutional questions, the 
practice of avoidance cannot fully explain this quasi-recognition. Even 
when the issue has been squarely presented, courts seem to prefer as-
sumption to express recognition. For example, in 1981 the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Haig v. Agee assumed that citizens have speech rights 
abroad; nevertheless, the Court concluded that the case was not an ap-
propriate one for balancing the speaker’s interests against the govern-
ment’s concerns.259 Similarly, some courts have assumed that U.S. re-
porters stationed abroad might in an appropriate case be entitled to 
some First Amendment protection.260 As discussed above, courts that 
have recognized citizens’ right to communicate with foreign audiences 
composed solely of aliens have not even attempted to justify First 
Amendment protection.261 Further, the few courts that have purported 
to recognize the extraterritorial speech rights of U.S. citizens, whether 
                                                                                                                      
258 See supra notes 45–257 and accompanying text. 
259 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981). 
260 See, e.g., Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175–76 (D.D.C. 2002) (declining to 
decide whether the American press had access rights abroad); Nation Magazine v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1571–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that, in the context of 
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261 See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1984) (assuming 
that application of export controls to an American company’s desire to respond to a ques-
tionnaire from an Arab trade group regarding its business dealings with Israel raised a 
justiciable First Amendment question); United States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d 516, 519–20 
(9th Cir. 1978) (applying the First Amendment to regulations that prohibited communica-
tion of technical data by a U.S. company to a French company). 
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on military bases or elsewhere, have offered no substantive justification 
for granting these rights.262 As a result, most trans-border First 
Amendment liberties are loosely rooted in dicta and judicial supposi-
tions. 
 Of course, to assume a right exists is not the same thing as ex-
pressly recognizing, substantively justifying, and judicially enforcing it. 
The judicial assumption is that a justification might be made for apply-
ing and enforcing First Amendment protection in some future appro-
priate case. The appropriate case, however, never seems to arise. As a 
class, trans-border liberties are more like constitutional possibilities 
than enforceable First Amendment rights. Thus, no court has granted 
any specific relief to citizens located on foreign soil in response to free 
press, speech, or associational claims. 
 Quasi-recognized liberty interests do not warrant the same sort of 
constitutional protection granted in domestic First Amendment con-
texts. Even trans-border First Amendment liberties that courts have 
purported to recognize explicitly turn out on closer inspection to be 
pale versions of their purely domestic counterparts. Although the 
Court invalidated a postal prior restraint in 1965 in Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, it did not offer any broad protection for cross-border commu-
nications or any substantive justification for protecting such ex-
changes.263 Similarly, although the Supreme Court in its 1972 decision 
in Kleindienst v. Mandel recognized that citizens have a First Amendment 
interest in meeting face-to-face with an alien speaker, it stated that the 
government needs only a “facially valid and bona fide” reason to over-
come that interest.264 Finally, even though in 1991 the Second Circuit 
in Lamont v. Woods recognized that the Establishment Clause may have 
some extraterritorial applicability, it was not clear that the court’s analy-
sis would apply to programs funded directly by the United States in for-
eign locations.265 Nor did the Woods court make clear just how much 
flexibility there might be in judicial application of the Establishment 
Clause beyond U.S. borders.266 
 Moreover, in contrast to analyses of First Amendment liberties in 
domestic contexts, courts seem almost determined to discover new lim-
its on cross-border collaborations. For example, one court suggested 
                                                                                                                      
262 See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331–33 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bullfrog Films, 
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that expressive associations involving more than one entity may not be 
protected at all and that cross-border associations may be restricted 
whenever foreign affairs concerns are present.267 The latter limitation 
might apply any time an association’s activities cross territorial borders. 
 Some trans-border First Amendment rights that once seemed on 
the verge of express recognition have been gradually devalued and de-
moted. For example, early Supreme Court cases like Kent v. Dulles in 
1958 and Aptheker v. Secretary of State in 1964 suggested a close link 
among travel, speech, and association.268 The Supreme Court later ex-
plained, however, that the right to travel beyond U.S. territorial borders 
is protected under the Due Process Clause rather than the First 
Amendment, and that cross-border travel was not a strong “right,” like 
the one that protects interstate travel within the United States, but a 
much weaker form of “freedom.”269 These terms make a substantial dif-
ference in the amount of constitutional protection afforded to interna-
tional travel for expressive purposes. The Due Process Clause provides 
only a thin layer of protection for the “freedom” to travel abroad.270 
 In addition to judicial supposition and demotion, quasi-recognition 
results in part from turning the traditional all-conduct-may-be-character-
ized-as-speech concern on its head in trans-border contexts. Thus, the 
following have all been characterized as regulations of conduct rather 
than speech: restricting a citizen’s travel abroad for the express purpose 
of gathering information,271 revoking a passport in response to disclo-
sure of sensitive information about American clandestine operations,272 
closing down a foreign mission,273 and traveling abroad to engage in a 
“human shield” protest.274 Of course, no court would ever think of char-
acterizing censorship of a book as a regulation of the conduct of writing, 
or a parade permit requirement as a mere regulation of public move-
ment. In trans-border contexts, however, the speech-conduct characteri-
zation is often inverted. The judicial default rule seems to be that all 
speech may be characterized as conduct. The one notable exception is 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
which rejected the government’s argument that speaking to a foreign 
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terrorist organization amounted to unprotected conduct.275 Neverthe-
less, the Court upheld federal material support laws as applied to ex-
pression and cross-border association.276 
 Courts have also mistakenly extended the travel and immigration 
precedents to a broad range of inapposite trans-border contexts. Deci-
sions like Mandel, which concerned the sovereign power to determine 
who may enter or leave the country, have been applied by courts to re-
solve such disparate matters as challenges by aliens to U.S. funding 
conditions and certain cross-border association claims.277 Extending 
the reach of these precedents has resulted in aliens’ First Amendment 
claims either being rejected on prudential standing grounds, or being 
subjected to something like Mandel’s “facially valid and bona fide rea-
son” standard.278 That standard, as argued above, is questionable even 
in its own domain. Extension of the plenary power doctrine to trans-
border First Amendment contexts that do not implicate the sovereign 
power to deal with territorial ingress and egress has thus contributed to 
the quasi-status of other trans-border First Amendment liberties. 
 In general, courts tend to tread lightly in foreign affairs, national 
security, and immigration contexts. Quasi-recognition of trans-border 
liberties is obviously a more conservative judicial approach than full-
throated recognition and enforcement. Courts must necessarily defer to 
the expertise and considered judgments of the military and other offi-
cials charged with protecting the nation’s borders and carrying out its 
foreign missions. Under the quasi-recognition modality, however, courts 
seem inclined to turn every utterance or association that intersects with 
territorial borders into a matter of national security or foreign affairs. As 
elsewhere, deference is due in trans-border contexts when the basis for 
it has been demonstrated. The mere fact that expressive and religious 
activities intersect with the nation’s borders, however, is not alone a 
proper ground for quasi-recognition. Nor is the fact that U.S. allies 
might object to extension of protection for cross-border speech and as-
sociation a proper basis for suppression or regulation.279 Based on the 
foregoing, although courts must be mindful of trans-border regulatory 
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and sovereignty interests, there are no broad foreign affairs, national 
security, or immigration exceptions to the First Amendment.280 
 Quasi-recognition of trans-border First Amendment liberties has 
engendered confusion regarding the status of certain common cross-
border communications. This includes speech directed by citizens to al-
iens abroad, as well as cross-border expressive associations. What does it 
mean to say that intentional publication of speech abroad may result in a 
waiver or “abandonment” of a citizen’s First Amendment protections?281 
Does anyone in fact have a right to receive expression abroad that origi-
nates in the United States? Despite the Court’s assurances to the con-
trary, Humanitarian Law Project seems to imperil a broad range of speech 
or associational activities by citizens that might in any way assist or legiti-
mize foreign terrorist organizations or offend our allies abroad.282 Fi-
nally, citizens have no real assurance that Establishment Clause and other 
religious liberties will be respected in foreign locations. 
B. The Foreign and the Domestic 
 Both the modality of quasi-recognition and the more general pro-
vincial conception of the First Amendment rest upon certain flawed 
and dated suppositions. One such supposition relates to the strict sepa-
ration between the foreign and domestic insofar as First Amendment 
activities and liberties are concerned. That supposition ignores impor-
tant historical lessons as well as present-day social and political realities. 
1. Trans-Border Historical Influences 
 It would obviously be ahistorical to suggest that the framing gen-
eration was thinking primarily of trans-border concerns when they 
drafted and ratified the First Amendment. It would also, however, be a 
mistake to view the framing of the Constitution and the ratification of 
the First Amendment as events wholly isolated from world influences. 
The First Amendment is, in part, a trans-border creation. 
 During the Revolutionary period, many leading figures held a cos-
mopolitan outlook and led worldly lives.283 Prominent framers also trav-
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eled abroad and maintained contacts with foreign principals, friends, 
and acquaintances. The framers, as well as early jurists and commenta-
tors, were curious about the world, in particular the lessons they might 
learn from foreign political systems, forms, and principles.284 They bor-
rowed concepts and ideas, including some fundamental First Amend-
ment principles such as the prohibition on prior restraints, from foreign 
legal systems.285 They sought to avoid religious persecution and other 
evils that had been experienced in foreign lands. Although the plan was 
obviously to forge a domestic political community of self-governing citi-
zens, the founding itself was no mere provincial event. 
 Trans-border influence extended well beyond trans-national bor-
rowing of concepts, concerns, and attitudes regarding free speech and 
religious liberty. The First Amendment was not forged, and certainly 
did not mature, in isolation from the rest of the world. Speech, press, 
association, and religious activities have had a critical trans-border di-
mension since the founding. This dimension, though infrequently 
taught in law schools or discussed in academic commentaries, has pro-
foundly shaped the modern First Amendment as it has been applied in 
a variety of domestic contexts. 
 Trans-border influence extends as far back as the nation’s early 
debates regarding the xenophobic Alien Act and the Alien and Sedi-
tion Act of 1798.286 These repressive measures, which authorized the 
expulsion of aliens and the suppression of speech critical of the gov-
ernment, raised the delicate question whether alien persons and ideas 
were themselves dangerous to domestic security. Early condemnation of 
these measures charted a path for free speech that would ultimately 
lead to protection for ideas and ideologies considered dangerous to the 
nation’s security or even the nation itself.287 
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 Moreover, many of the perceived public threats addressed during 
the modern First Amendment’s formative years in the twentieth cen-
tury came directly from foreign ideologies, including radicalism, social-
ism, and Communism, which were treated (much like terrorism is to-
day) as radioactive belief systems.288 In these trans-national ideological 
battles, the Supreme Court eventually prohibited various forms of ideo-
logical discrimination and guilt-by-association—many targeting foreign 
persons, groups, and ideas.289 As noted earlier, the first congressional 
enactment the Supreme Court ever invalidated on First Amendment 
grounds was the postal law limiting receipt of foreign propaganda chal-
lenged in Lamont.290 
 The supposed foreign-domestic divide is not so clear with regard to 
other First Amendment guarantees either. As the Court recognized in 
New York Times Co. v. United States, its 1971 decision addressing the publi-
cation of the Pentagon Papers, the Free Press Clause was intended to 
ensure Americans’ access to news and information regarding the gov-
ernment’s actions not just inside the United States but beyond its bor-
ders as well.291 Further, as noted, explicit protection for religious liber-
ties in America and its new territories was plainly motivated to a substan-
tial degree by notorious examples of religious persecution abroad.292 In 
sum, the First Amendment has a rich trans-border heritage. 
2. The Social Realities of Globalization and Digitization 
 The problem with provincialism runs much deeper than its his-
torical blinders. Modern political and social realities have blurred the 
supposedly strict divide between foreign and domestic First Amend-
ment activities and concerns upon which provincialism is based. 
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 First Amendment provincialism generally assumes that citizens’ 
activities and interests remain primarily local in nature. Thus, as we 
have seen, if it did not occur inside our borders, is not intended to take 
place there, or does not relate to a matter of “domestic” public con-
cern, the First Amendment may fade from focus or simply disappear 
altogether.293 Moreover, as Humanitarian Law Project and other cases 
show, even when the First Amendment rights of citizens are directly at 
stake, the presence of some foreign factor, contact, or influence can 
result in far less robust scrutiny and consequently less protection for 
speech, press, associational, and other liberties.294 
 Globalization and the digitization of expression have decreased 
the significance of territorial borders insofar as First Amendment activi-
ties are concerned. In the modern era, speech and association are less 
frequently confined inside territorial borders. In the emerging global 
theater, a domestic speaker can easily reach a worldwide audience. The 
widespread use of the Internet and the proliferation of media outlets 
make it more difficult to confine domestic disputes and controversies 
to local, state, or even national boundaries. For example, a pastor from 
a small Florida town set off an international firestorm when he threat-
ened to burn the Qu’ran as a sign of his disapproval of Islam.295 Simi-
larly, local debates regarding the location of an Islamic center in Man-
hattan quickly became matters of global and diplomatic concern.296 
The marketplace of ideas is rapidly becoming more global. 
 Moreover, citizens’ concerns are also increasingly global in charac-
ter and orientation. Local attachments and issues, although still un-
doubtedly central to many Americans, are no longer of singular impor-
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tance for many citizens.297 Citizens frequently share common causes— 
for example, human rights, climate change, freedom of information, 
religious liberty—with others across the world.298 As a result of immi-
gration patterns, U.S. citizens are coming into more frequent contact 
with aliens inside our borders.299 In this new environment, even speech 
that takes place abroad and relates solely to so-called “foreign” events 
and concerns may be of considerable interest to sizeable constituencies 
within the United States. 
 In sum, it has become increasingly difficult to identify issues or 
matters that are of purely domestic or purely foreign concern, and do-
ing so is likely to become even more difficult in the future. 
3. The Limits of Territoriality 
 It has also become increasingly difficult to maintain a neat physical 
separation between the foreign and domestic insofar as First Amend-
ment activities are concerned. As a result, some territorial laws and doc-
trines are likely to be ill-suited to the new realities of trans-border in-
formation flow and exchange. 
 Contrary to judicial and academic assumptions, we can no longer 
simply assume that an audience is either domestic or foreign. Millions of 
U.S. citizens travel and reside abroad, often for the express purpose of 
seeking out foreign ideas, experiences, and cultures.300 Many hold citi-
zenship status in more than one nation and have close relatives 
abroad.301 (The same is true, of course, for many aliens residing in the 
United States.) Thus, audiences across the globe increasingly comprise a 
mixture of U.S. citizens and aliens. Courts and legislatures will have to 
take that reality into account when examining trans-border First 
Amendment issues. Further, although their numbers have recently de-
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clined (in part owing to economic setbacks at home) a substantial por-
tion of the U.S. press continues to report on global events from foreign 
locations.302 Reports by the U.S. press corps are routinely directed not 
only to U.S. citizens at home but also to global audiences, often by way 
of networking media including web sites and blogs. Similarly, large 
numbers of U.S. missionaries and other human rights activists presently 
live and work abroad. In sum, the provincial image of a sedentary, pas-
sive, and mostly provincial populace can no longer be squared with the 
social realities of territoriality. 
 First Amendment provincialism also rests upon a formalistic un-
derstanding of the relationship between territorial and governmental 
power. Provincialism generally assumes that exercises of U.S. sovereign 
power are either domestic or foreign in nature. Further, provincialism 
generally assumes that purely domestic exercises of power are the only 
ones that fall legitimately within the First Amendment’s domain. 
 In reality, these foreign and domestic spheres are often blurred or 
intricately connected. Funding decisions made by U.S. agency officials 
inside the United States may profoundly affect expressive and religious 
liberties abroad.303 Conditions placed upon foreign recipients’ speech 
abroad may have a substantial impact on discussions regarding certain 
issues across the globe.304 Similarly, decisions taken with respect to reg-
ulation of Internet access at home, or domestic policies regarding In-
ternet domain names, may well impact U.S. anti-censorship and free 
information initiatives abroad. 
 A refusal to apply First Amendment protection to citizens’ speech 
that is published or republished in a foreign country may substantially 
affect the marketplace of ideas both abroad and inside the United 
States.305 Moreover, as Lamont v. Woods recognized in extending the Es-
tablishment Clause to some U.S.-funded projects abroad, funding of 
religious endeavors abroad may strengthen the standing and fiscal 
health of denominations with substantial ties inside the United States.306 
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Finally, owing to new technologies that allow information disseminated 
abroad to easily find its way back into the United States, prohibitions 
like the one affecting domestic dissemination of U.S. foreign propa-
ganda currently seem to make little or no sense.307 
 In conclusion, First Amendment liberties were forged against the 
backdrop of a trans-border dimension that included a cosmopolitan 
framing generation, conflicts regarding foreign persons and ideologies, 
and a desire to avoid and check governmental abuses with respect to 
expressive and religious liberties abroad. In these important senses, the 
modern First Amendment is a product of influences and concerns that 
transcend territorial borders. Provincialism fails to acknowledge this 
progeny, to account for modern communicative and other social reali-
ties, and to appreciate that governmental regulations and First Amend-
ment activities routinely traverse territorial borders. To be clear, this cri-
tique does not suggest that no relevant distinctions can be drawn be-
tween aliens and citizens insofar as the First Amendment is concerned 
or that the First Amendment ought to be interpreted by reference to 
foreign standards or laws. This Article’s goal is a narrower one, namely 
to cast doubt upon the provincial supposition that the First Amendment 
pertains almost exclusively to territorially defined domestic activities, 
regulations, and concerns. 
C. Provincial Attitudes Regarding Foreign Contacts 
 America has historically vacillated between a cosmopolitan open-
ness to foreign contacts and cultures and various degrees of ideological 
wariness and isolationism.308 That debate obviously continues to this 
day. In his opinion for the Court in Humanitarian Law Project, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts derided “the dissent’s world,” where cross-border collabo-
ration “is all to the good.”309 He sharply noted that “Congress and the 
Executive, however, have concluded that we live in a different world” in 
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which certain foreign organizations are so tainted by their criminal el-
ement as to warrant isolation.310 
 As noted earlier, over time our free speech jurisprudence em-
braced the idea, first suggested in Justice Holmes’s famous dissent in 
Abrams v. United States, which was decided in 1919, that citizens ought to 
embrace head-on the challenges posed by foreign ideologies such as 
communism and anarchism and soundly defeat them in the market-
place of ideas.311 In cases like Aptheker and Kent, the notion that foreign 
ideologies were themselves an inherent danger was criticized and seem-
ingly vanquished.312 Indeed, after the Cold War, Congress and execu-
tive agencies began to respond to economic incentives, international 
pressures, and First Amendment concerns by removing certain ideo-
logical and other barriers to cross-border information flow.313 
 As we have seen, however, First Amendment provincialism still 
evinces a strong skepticism toward foreign communications, contacts, 
and influences. As presently interpreted by the Supreme Court, the 
First Amendment does not clearly deny officials power to exclude per-
sons from our shores based solely upon their beliefs or associations.314 
Foreign propaganda is still singled out as a threat to the United States 
and its citizens.315 Election campaign contributions by resident and for-
eign aliens are absolutely banned under U.S. law.316 The ban on direct 
contributions ostensibly exists to protect U.S elections from foreign in-
fluence, a problem first identified during hearings held by Senator Ful-
bright in 1966.317 As revealed during those hearings, foreign nationals 
were then apparently seeking to influence domestic policy on import 
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quotas.318 The ban on alien contributions has received renewed atten-
tion of late. In 2010 in Citizens United v. FEC, a majority of the Supreme 
Court reserved the question whether the ban is unconstitutional;319 
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that it would indeed likely survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.320 
 Terrorism is, of course, the newest ideological and physical threat 
to the United States. In upholding a criminal ban on peaceful speech 
coordinated with designated foreign terrorist organizations, the major-
ity of the Court in Humanitarian Law Project cited James Madison’s ob-
servation, in The Federalist No. 41, that “[s]ecurity against foreign dan-
ger is . . . an avowed and essential object of the American Union.”321 We 
ought to be clear about the nature of the foreign danger the Court 
identified. According to the Court, one such danger was that citizens’ 
political speech might legitimize the targeted foreign organizations.322 
Moreover, the Court for the first time treated words and weapons as 
fungible.323 Under this worldview, Congress could prohibit citizens 
from engaging in even the most peaceful collaborations with certain 
officially disfavored foreign groups. 
 Fear of foreign ideas, ideologies, and organizations is deeply en-
trenched in our First Amendment history and jurisprudence. Humani-
tarian Law Project shows that we have not yet moved beyond the provin-
cial worldview. As Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, the Court’s de-
cision strongly suggests that some of the important lessons of history 
seem to have been lost on the majority.324 
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D. Theoretical Parochialism 
 Finally, provincialism suffers from a strain of theoretical parochial-
ism that unduly narrows the First Amendment’s potential domain. As 
noted earlier, relatively few courts or commentators have explicitly ad-
dressed the theoretical issues associated with trans-border expression 
and religious liberties. Judicial and academic analyses have generally 
assumed that trans-border activities must satisfy traditional First Amend- 
ment justifications, such as those relating to self-government and the 
search for truth in the free speech context. No one has yet endeavored 
to develop a theory or justification that applies specifically to trans-
border First Amendment liberties. 
 Traditional First Amendment justifications were developed largely 
within the confines of domestic debates concerning the scope of First 
Amendment freedoms. As a result, it is hardly surprising that many have 
found it difficult to extend the scope of these justifications to trans-
border liberties. For example, Robert Kamenshine concluded that when 
a domestic speaker seeks to communicate with an audience composed 
solely of aliens located abroad, “generally cited First Amendment values 
have little or no application.”325 In general, he observed: “We are not 
constitutionally committed to facilitating [First Amendment] objectives 
abroad.”326 That opinion seems to be shared by a number of other 
commentators, who have suggested that traditional free speech justifica-
tions are limited to parochial concerns and the operation of domestic 
marketplaces of ideas.327 Free press justifications have also traditionally 
focused on national concerns rather than global ones.328 Finally, al-
though Woods is exceptional insofar as it suggested that anti-establish- 
ment principles applied extraterritorially, some scholars have ques-
tioned whether extension of such principles to foreign contexts is ap-
propriate.329 
                                                                                                                      
325 Kamenshine, supra note 11, at 866. 
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paradigm” from a national to a global forum with regard to press freedoms). 
329 See generally Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 30. 
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 Again, there is no question that domestic concerns were central to 
the First Amendment’s ratification and early interpretation. The ques-
tion is whether those concerns exhaust the First Amendment’s theo-
retical sphere or domain. Traditional free speech justifications have 
been robustly criticized, even as applied to domestic concerns.330 Addi-
tionally, as Jack Balkin has observed, the traditional self-governance 
justification for freedom of speech may simply be “too narrow in the 
age of the Internet.”331 One might make the same claim with regard to 
other traditional free speech justifications, including the search for 
truth and individual autonomy. In addition, the press has long been a 
check on government wherever it is acting. Finally, there is no a priori 
reason why justifications for protecting religious liberties in purely do-
mestic contexts cannot apply to trans-border activities. 
 This does not mean, however, that we must abandon all of the tra-
ditional justifications and start from scratch when considering the First 
Amendment’s trans-border dimension. For example, some commenta-
tors have argued that purely ideological alien exclusions violate tradi-
tional First Amendment values pertaining to citizen self-governance 
and the search for truth.332 In general, the scope of traditional con-
cepts such as self-governance might be expanded, the boundaries of 
the marketplace of ideas might be extended, and the domain of ex-
pressive and religious autonomy might be interpreted to reach certain 
trans-border activities.333 
                                                                                                                     
 Provincial First Amendment precedents, however, offer little if any 
support for such expansion. Lamont did not offer a robust justification 
for protecting cross-border exchanges;334 nor do we have a New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan 335 that justifies robust press freedoms in trans-
 
330 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amend-
ment Ideal, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 799 (critiquing the marketplace metaphor); Martin H. Re-
dish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of 
Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1303, 1304 (2009) 
(critiquing self-governance theory). 
331 Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 427, 438 
(2009). 
332 See Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 
100 Harv. L. Rev. 930, 930 (1987). 
333 See Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 361–67 (1992) (discuss-
ing concept of a global marketplace of ideas and the importance of nations respecting the 
“free flow of information across all international borders”). 
334 See supra notes 46–57 and accompanying text. 
335 376 U.S. at 270 (“[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”). 
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border contexts.336 Further, international travel cases like Zemel and 
Haig strongly suggest that individual autonomy principles do not carry 
much force in the trans-border realm.337 Finally, very little has been 
written regarding the applicability of traditional First Amendment justi-
fications for protection of religious liberties in trans-border contexts.338 
Neither courts nor commentators have addressed whether or to what 
extent coercion, neutrality, and endorsement concerns extend beyond 
U.S. borders. At present, First Amendment justifications remain pro-
vincial or parochial in orientation. 
III. Toward a More Cosmopolitan Conception of  
the First Amendment 
 This final Part describes and normatively defends a more cosmo-
politan conception of the First Amendment that differs in fundamental 
respects from the traditional provincial orientation. The proposed con-
ception is cosmopolitan in the definitional rather than the philosophi-
cal sense. It posits a First Amendment that is not limited solely to local 
or provincial concerns and is more at home in various parts of the 
world. The normative basis for First Amendment cosmopolitanism rests 
upon both traditional First Amendment values and the existence of in-
ternational obligations with respect to expressive and religious liberties. 
These values and obligations include maximizing citizens’ participation 
in global affairs and debates, facilitating the discovery and reporting of 
information without regard to location or audience, avoiding arbitrary 
interferences with citizens’ and aliens’ freedom of expression and belief 
both at home and abroad, and governmental transparency. The basic 
operational principles underlying First Amendment cosmopolitanism 
are freedom of movement, free flow of information across borders, 
portability of First Amendment rights and obligations, and respect for 
foreign expressive and religious cultures. This Part demonstrates how 
the adoption of First Amendment cosmopolitanism by legislatures and 
courts might affect the rights of various constituencies: U.S. citizens 
traveling and residing abroad, citizens and aliens participating in cross-
border exchanges, citizens engaging in dialogue with disfavored aliens 
at home and abroad, the American press, and expressive and religious 
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cultures abroad. Finally, it briefly summarizes some of the broader im-
plications of First Amendment cosmopolitanism. 
A. First Amendment Values in an Emerging Global Theater 
 As noted, globalization, digitization, and internationalism have sub-
stantially altered the First Amendment’s relationship to territorial bor-
ders.339 Speakers, speech, press activities, and a host of unique associa-
tions (real and virtual) increasingly transcend the nation-state. Ameri-
can power continues to extend to distant shores, where it intersects with 
foreign expressive and religious cultures. De-territorialization is a social, 
political, and legal fact that undermines the traditional notion that 
where one is located determines what constitutional rights he enjoys.340 
We need a fundamental change in orientation with regard to First 
Amendment liberties, one that comports with these twenty-first century 
realities.341 
 Now more than ever, it is imperative that citizens be able to partici-
pate fully and confidently in global debates and affairs.342 To do this, 
they will need access to foreign persons, information, and ideas. They 
will need firm assurances that when they, or their speech or other activi-
ties, cross international borders, this will not result in a waiver or aban-
donment of First Amendment protections. Uncertainty with regard to 
trans-border liberties may decrease global exchange and interaction by 
chilling expression or limiting debate to domestic marketplaces. Just as 
it broadens opportunities in traditional domestic contexts, the First 
Amendment ought to maximize participation in cross-border political, 
artistic, scientific, educational, and religious exchanges. It ought also to 
protect against governmental coercion, or lack of neutrality, with regard 
to religious practices that take place abroad. 
 Adopting a more global and cosmopolitan perspective would not 
entail a radical shift in the way we think about core First Amendment 
values and principles. Neither scholars nor courts have ever sought to 
develop any coherent or holistic approach to the First Amendment’s 
trans-border dimension. Fortunately, we need not start entirely from 
scratch to justify a more cosmopolitan conception of the First Amend-
                                                                                                                      
339 See supra notes 293–307. 
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341 Cf. Bollinger, supra note 297, at 131 (arguing that, with respect to a free press, 
“[w]hat is fundamentally needed is a change in our orientation, characterized by the task 
of opening up the world to a press that is independent and free”). 
342 See Roth, supra note 27, at 282–91 (emphasizing the importance of citizens’ partici-
pation in world affairs). 
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ment. Although current provincial justifications and theories may not 
be completely up to this task, these justifications are susceptible to 
more cosmopolitan interpretations. Notwithstanding that traditional 
free speech theories may have been designed with purely domestic 
concerns and conditions in mind, the core values underlying them ac-
tually have considerable force in many trans-border contexts. Provin-
cialism has simply denied or obscured the salience of such values in a 
number of trans-border contexts. 
 In the free speech and association contexts, self-governance values 
are often implicated in trans-border contexts. In the twenty-first cen-
tury, the domain of self-governance has vastly expanded. As noted ear-
lier, to many in the United States, matters of public concern and poli-
tics are not narrowly confined inside the nation’s territorial borders. In 
our interconnected world, a self-governing person must not only have 
access to information regarding the local community, but she must also 
have at least a working knowledge of issues of global scope and signifi-
cance. She must know, for example, what her own national government 
is saying on her behalf in foreign lands. She ought to have some sense 
of how domestic policies and politics will affect foreign peoples, cul-
tures, and communities. Only some of this information can be acquired 
from inside the United States or from U.S. sources. Insofar as matters 
of public concern to U.S. citizens have a global scope or proportion, 
twenty-first century self-governance requires a robust trans-border ex-
change of ideas and information. We ought to recognize that Alexan-
der Meiklejohn’s town meeting is becoming more like a global thea-
ter.343 
 Moreover, it makes less and less sense to think of the marketplace 
of ideas as a physical place strictly bounded by territory. Rather, the 
modern marketplace extends to trans-border spaces.344 In addition, 
Americans’ search for truth plainly does not end at the water’s edge. In 
the trans-border marketplace, the ideas and ideologies of citizens at 
home and aliens abroad can be tested against one another. Consistent 
with longstanding free speech values preferring robust engagement to 
isolation, foreign persons and ideas ought to be welcomed to this trans-
border dialogue rather than restricted or banned from it. 
 Individual autonomy concerns relate to core speech and religious 
liberties, which similarly extend to all corners of the globe. Even if one 
does not self-identify as a global citizen, the process of self-actualization 
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and the pursuit of one’s beliefs often involves connections and activities 
that cross or traverse U.S. borders. Moreover, to check governmental 
abuses, citizens and the press often need access to information and ma-
terials that are only available beyond U.S. borders.345 
 Thus, even under traditional justifications it is far from clear that 
trans-border activities and liberties lie closer to the periphery of the 
First Amendment than its core. Extending traditional theories, how-
ever, will not alone lead to full embrace of trans-border First Amend-
ment liberties and activities. This will require distinct and more de-
territorialized justifications for protecting expressive and religious lib-
erties. As Jack Balkin has observed, the traditional self-governance justi-
fication for freedom of speech is simply “too narrow in the age of the 
Internet.”346 He observes: “[W]hat people do on the Internet tran-
scends the nation state; they participate in discussions, debate, and col-
lective activity that does not respect national borders.”347 Balkin persua-
sively argues that these activities “should not be protected only because 
and to the degree that they might contribute to debate about American 
politics, or even American foreign policy.”348 Rather, Balkin claims that 
expressive activities ought to be protected insofar as they contribute to 
what he calls “democratic culture.”349 One could similarly argue that 
concerns regarding religious liberty transcend the nation-state and are 
deserving of respect and protection without regard to where govern-
mental coercion or purposeful interference occurs. 
 Although Balkin’s theory has attractive cosmopolitan characteris-
tics, it is too narrowly concerned with technological collaboration to 
serve as a basis for defending the full range of cross-border information 
flow addressed in this Article. The free cross-border flow of information 
is a First Amendment concern of the highest order because it facilitates 
participation in global conversations, debates, and dialogues. Only some 
of this participation involves or depends upon new technologies. More-
over, freedom of movement—of persons and papers as well as bytes—is 
critical to the free exchange of information across diverse cultures. 
Cross-border exchange ought to be valued in its own right—regardless 
of content (assuming it is legal where sent and received), context, or the 
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type of culture it facilitates or creates. Ultimately, political, artistic, aca-
demic, commercial, and religious exchanges may or may not produce 
democratic and egalitarian cultures. Nonetheless, these interactions of-
fer critical opportunities to engage with foreign persons and ideas, to 
participate in debates and dialogues on matters of global concern, and 
to discover what is being conveyed across and beyond one’s own bor-
ders. The First Amendment ought to be interpreted such that it applies 
whenever laws and regulations interfere with such opportunities. 
 Under a more cosmopolitan interpretation, we ought to think of 
the First Amendment’s core guarantees as globally operative. By this I 
do not mean that they are universal human rights applicable anywhere 
in the world and to anyone regardless of circumstance. Rather, the crit-
ical point is that the importance of expressive and religious freedoms 
does not simply dissipate at the international border. Indeed, these lib-
erties are properly viewed by the community of nations, including the 
United States, as trans-border and universal concerns. 
 By virtue of various statutes and international covenants, the Unit-
ed States is formally committed to this more cosmopolitan conception 
of First Amendment liberties. As a participant in the Helsinki Accords, 
the United States agreed to loosen restrictions on trans-national travel 
and information-sharing; indeed, Congress has amended certain laws 
to reflect this commitment.350 Moreover, the United States was the driv-
ing force behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provision 
relating to freedom of information, which provides: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes free-
dom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media regardless of fron-
tiers.”351 Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which the United States has ratified, provides that everyone has 
the right to hold opinions “without interference” and that freedom of 
expression includes the “freedom to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
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in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”352 To-
gether, these international commitments obligate the United States to 
liberalize or eliminate restrictions on cross-border movement and in-
formation flow. 
 Similarly, with regard to religious freedoms, the United States sup-
ports article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
recognizes that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion,” including the right to teach, practice and observe 
religion or belief in public or private contexts.353 In addition, Congress 
enacted the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).354 
IRFA obligates Congress and the President to “oppose violations of reli-
gious freedom that are or have been engaged in or tolerated by the gov-
ernments of foreign countries” and “to promote the right to freedom of 
religion in those countries.”355 
 To be sure, enforcement mechanisms under these covenants and 
statutes are notoriously weak, and the United States has joined or en-
acted the measures on the condition that they must be interpreted with 
reference to existing First Amendment principles and doctrines.356 This 
Article does not claim that these covenants and agreements are legally 
enforceable in the United States absent statutory consent. The com-
mitments we have made to trans-border expressive and religious liber-
ties, however, ought to inform the manner in which legislatures and 
courts approach trans-border First Amendment issues. If the proposed 
cosmopolitan turn is to occur, we must first address the inconsistency 
between domestic principles and modalities, such as quasi-recognition, 
and our international commitments. Strictly provincial accounts of the 
First Amendment are inconsistent with the fact that freedom of expres-
sion and religion are now recognized as international human rights 
that ought to be preserved and enforced without regard to frontiers. A 
more cosmopolitan First Amendment would acknowledge the de-
territorialization of liberties of movement, information, and belief. 
 In combination with the proposed extension of the scope of tradi-
tional First Amendment justifications, the existing human rights 
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framework provides a basis for recognizing and enforcing expressive 
and religious liberties in some trans-border contexts. Viewing trans-
border liberties as closer to the First Amendment’s core than its pe-
riphery provides a justification for revisiting and, this Article will argue, 
in some cases rejecting provincial precedents and laws. As discussed 
below, this cosmopolitan orientation has broader implications as well. 
B. The Principles, and Principal Effects, of First Amendment Cosmopolitanism 
 This Section sets forth more concrete principles and arguments in 
favor of the proposed cosmopolitan turn. It also discusses some of the 
concrete legal and doctrinal changes that ought to follow. 
1. Cross-Border Movement, “Commingling,” and Information-
Gathering 
 Cross-border engagement, collaboration, and to some extent in-
formation-gathering depend critically upon freedom of movement. In-
deed, the first condition that must be met for full and open participa-
tion in global debates and affairs is robust protection for a right to cross 
borders to engage in expression, inquiry, and free exercise of religion. 
 The prospects for recognition of a First Amendment right to trav-
erse international borders were strongest in the late 1950s and early 
1960s when the Supreme Court decided Kent v. Dulles in 1958 and Ap-
theker v. Secretary of State in 1964.357 Later decisions, including the 
Court’s 1965 decision in Zemel v. Rusk, and 1981 decision in Haig v. Agee, 
effectively reversed course, though, and recognized only the more pro-
vincial due process-based “freedom” to travel abroad.358 These deci-
sions effectively neutered any First Amendment liberty to travel abroad 
for purposes of inquiry and information-gathering. Later, in 1972, the 
Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel failed to clearly condemn ideological ex-
clusion of foreign speakers, scholars, and artists.359 
 Today, it may be tempting to reason that because speech can tran-
scend territorial borders via the Internet, there is less need for a fun-
damental right of cross-border movement. But even in the digital era, 
freedom of speech and other First Amendment liberties still depend 
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upon rights of cross-border movement and trans-border information-
gathering. Citizens, including institutional press members, academics, 
and religious activists exit the United States by the millions each year. 
Alien artists, scholars, and officials continue to seek entry to the United 
States in substantial numbers—although one wonders how long this 
will be the case should officials steadfastly claim the right to deny entry 
on ideological grounds. 
 The Internet greatly facilitates cross-border expression and associa-
tion. As Saskia Sassen has noted, however, “[d]igital domains cannot (at 
least for now) fully encompass the lived experience of users or the do-
main of institutional orders and cultural formations.”360 As Mandel ex-
pressly recognized, the fact that technology facilitates distanced or, pre-
sumably, even virtual connectivity does not negate the value of in-person 
expression and association.361 In the contexts of national egress and in-
gress, it may be tempting to rely upon statutory limits on expressive and 
religious discrimination. But as recent history relating to ideological 
immigration exclusions shows, statutory and regulatory protections do 
not provide any guarantee against such discrimination. Moreover, re-
strictions on cross-border movement are most likely to be enacted when 
political tensions with regard to immigration and national security are 
heightened. Thus, it remains important that we have a constitutional 
foundation for cross-border movement and intermingling. 
 That foundation ought not to rest on the thin branch of the Due 
Process Clause, which imposes only limited constraints on government. 
Rather, it ought to rest upon the firmer foundation of the First 
Amendment. The most eloquent defense of this position was provided 
by Zecharia Chafee, who authored an insightful defense of some basic 
human rights as reflected in the original Constitution,362 and Justice 
Douglas, who articulated a cosmopolitan view of the right to travel for 
the Court in Kent and for himself in Aptheker.363 
 Chafee cited freedom of movement—as citizens to leave the coun-
try and travel abroad and as aliens to enter without being subjected to 
arbitrary barriers—as among the Constitution’s original human rights.364 
First Amendment values substantially influenced his conception of free-
dom of movement.365 The freedom to travel abroad was important, he 
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wrote, to “foreign correspondents and lecturers of public affairs” who 
needed first-hand information.366 Chafee also recognized the impor-
tance of foreign travel to scientists, scholars, and academic pursuits: 
“Scientists and scholars gain greatly from consultations with colleagues 
in other countries. Students equip themselves for more fruitful careers 
in the United States by instruction in foreign universities.”367 In addi-
tion, Chafee mentioned the importance of “reuniting families,” which 
directly affects rights of intimate association.368 Ultimately, he con-
cluded: “Our nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of 
plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as 
he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.”369 
 Chafee viewed Americans not as homebound and passive recipi-
ents, but as active participants in trans-border exchanges and affairs. 
Although he recognized the critical connection between cross-border 
movement and freedoms of speech and association, Chafee did not ad-
vance a thoroughly outward-looking justification for protecting foreign 
travel. Rather, he considered the right to cross-border movement to be 
especially critical to domestic self-governance. Chafee noted that the 
right to travel abroad helped U.S. citizens to be well informed on the 
domestic issues of the day and to understand that people like them-
selves live abroad.370 The ability to go abroad and to literally see things 
for themselves meant that American citizens were not limited to gov-
ernment-provided information or information collected by a few corre-
spondents.371 Ultimately, Chafee believed that “views on domestic ques-
tions are enriched by seeing how foreigners are trying to solve similar 
problems.”372 Contacts abroad, he wrote, “contribute to sounder deci-
sions at home.”373 
 Justice Douglas, who also described a more cosmopolitan concep-
tion of the intersection between foreign travel and First Amendment 
liberties, quoted the above observations by Chafee at some length in his 
opinion for the Court in Kent.374 In his concurring opinion in Aptheker, 
Douglas wrote that the importance of cross-border travel was important 
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not merely for self-governance purposes, but for “cultural, political, and 
social activities—for all the commingling which gregarious man en-
joys.”375 He described liberty of egress as “kin to the right of assembly 
and the right of association.”376 
 To those who argued that limiting the government’s power to re-
strict egress diminished national sovereignty, Douglas responded: 
“America is of course sovereign; but her sovereignty is woven in an in-
ternational web that makes her one of the family of nations.”377 As the 
first stirrings of what would later be known as “globalization” were be-
ing felt in the United States and across the world, Douglas wrote: “The 
ties with all the continents are close—commercially, as well as culturally. 
Our concerns are planetary, beyond sunrises and sunsets. Citizenship 
implicates us in those problems and perplexities, as well as in domestic 
ones.”378 According to Douglas it was an inescapable fact, even then, 
that neither the American people nor the matters that were of greatest 
concern to them were purely domestic or provincial. His was an early, 
and hopeful, cosmopolitan interpretation of the right to travel. 
 Today an impressive amount of information is available at one’s 
fingertips through the Internet. Most of that information, however, is 
mediated or filtered in some fashion. Personal travel remains the only 
certain way to receive raw, unvarnished information. Justice Douglas, 
dissenting in Zemel, acknowledged the critical importance of First 
Amendment protection for this sort of foreign inquiry: “The right to 
know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe social, 
physical, political and other phenomena abroad as well as at home 
gives meaning and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of 
the press.”379 According to Douglas, the “ability to understand this plu-
ralistic world, filled with clashing ideologies, is a prerequisite of citizen-
ship . . . .”380 
 Although the Court dismissively brushed the idea aside in Zemel, 
one commentator has argued that cross-border movement is an expres-
sive activity entitled to First Amendment protection.381 Although this 
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may be so in a particular case, courts are not as a general matter likely 
to view travel itself as a form of symbolic conduct. A First Amendment 
right to cross-border travel, however, would rest on firmer ground inso-
far as it served more specific expressive interests. 
 Some commentators have advanced proposals for extending First 
Amendment protection to travel insofar as it facilitates foreign inquiry 
and information-gathering.382 Unfortunately, the proposals have been 
rather narrow and tentative. For example, Barry McDonald would limit 
the right to gather information abroad to circumstances in which (1) 
the putative recipient intends to broadly disseminate the information 
gathered inside the United States, (2) the information pertains to a 
matter of political concern within the United States, and (3) the in-
formation is sought by a member of some group whose function it is to 
obtain such information for the purpose of public dissemination.383 
Under this rather provincial formulation, the institutional press report-
ing on matters relating to the foreign operations of the U.S. govern-
ment abroad would have the strongest—indeed perhaps the only— 
claim to First Amendment protection. Even if an individual traveler in-
tended to blog about her experience to an audience composed of fel-
low citizens, no individual right to gather information abroad would be 
recognized under this approach. 
 There are certainly reasons to proceed with caution in recognizing 
something as broad as a right to gather information on foreign soil. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear why the interest in information-gathering 
ought to be so limited. The category of subjects that are of concern to a 
great many Americans cannot be narrowly confined to domestic poli-
tics.384 Moreover, whether or not one has press credentials ought not to 
determine whether one has a First Amendment interest in gathering 
information abroad. As in the domestic context, the institutional press 
has no monopoly on foreign information-gathering. Particularly in the 
digital era, “the press” does not necessarily comprise solely institutional 
outlets whose function it is to disseminate the news to broad segments 
of the American public. Finally, why should domestic dissemination be a 
prerequisite? This seems to assume that (1) the First Amendment is in 
no way concerned with the global dissemination of information, 
                                                                                                                      
382 See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a 
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and/or (2) foreign audiences are always composed solely of aliens. For 
the reasons discussed earlier, First Amendment cosmopolitanism rejects 
these suppositions on the ground that they are contrary to twenty-first 
century realities.385 
 The millions of Americans who travel abroad each year might be 
surprised to learn that they have only a weak due process interest in 
leaving the country, even if for the express purpose of engaging in ex-
pressive or religious activities.386 Under the Court’s precedents, one has 
the First Amendment right to access information received through the 
mail or some other domestic vehicle.387 The provincial First Amend-
ment, however, does not affirmatively protect one’s right to seek out 
information or relationships by going directly and in person to foreign 
sources.388 In an era in which federal watch lists and other limits on 
international travel are expanding, statutory protections may prove too 
weak to protect basic rights of cross-border movement, commingling, 
and information-gathering. 
 Chafee and Douglas were prescient in their assertions that foreign 
travel ought to have a constitutional status commensurate with its im-
portance to human rights. The artist, scholar, or protester who seeks to 
go abroad for the purpose of commingling, lecturing, or engaging in 
public dissent is engaging in First Amendment activities. Recognition of 
this fact would not mean that the painter, the professor, and the “human 
shield” would have a constitutionally protected right to go anywhere 
they please to engage in these activities, but it would at least require that 
the government articulate some basis for restricting movement that 
outweighs the citizen’s interest in travel for expressive purposes. 
 The First Amendment right to travel abroad ought to be given 
special solicitude insofar as travel is undertaken for the purpose of 
gathering information.389 This right would encompass traveling for the 
express purpose of gathering information about foreign cultures, par-
ticipating in foreign debates or cultural activities, and collaborating 
with foreign religious institutions. Its recognition would clearly benefit 
                                                                                                                      
385 See supra notes 258–338 and accompanying text. 
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the press, which ought to at least have some limited right to report on 
matters relating to the conduct of war abroad.390 
 Although the press would certainly benefit from such recognition, 
this aspect of the right to travel ought not to be limited to the institu-
tional press. Nor should its recognition and enforcement depend upon 
a proven intent to disseminate any gathered information to domestic 
audiences. The international human right to seek information without 
regard to borders is not conditioned upon membership in the institu-
tional press or reporting to domestic audiences. Furthermore, the great 
promise of the digital era is that information can be distributed without 
regard to territorial borders to mixed audiences across the globe. A 
more cosmopolitan interpretation of the First Amendment interest in 
foreign travel would facilitate that goal by recognizing a right to travel 
abroad, gather information, and communicate that information to 
global audiences. 
 Once again, recognizing an interest in foreign information-
gathering does not mean that citizens will ultimately be successful in 
challenging foreign travel restrictions. It does mean, however, that the 
traveler’s First Amendment rights and interests cannot be dismissed as 
mere conduct. As in other contexts, the government ought to be com-
pelled to justify limits on protected First Amendment interests in cross-
border travel. 
 Of course, travel, inquiry, and information-gathering flow in more 
than one direction. Like the freedom to exit or leave the country, the 
freedom to enter makes it possible, as the U.N. Declaration of Human 
Rights states, to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”391 Even during a time 
when strict limits on immigration were in place, Chafee noted that 
there was still “plenty of room . . . for temporary visitors from abroad to 
land, look around, talk, learn, and let us learn from them.”392 He la-
mented that, in the 1950s, many scholars and lecturers had been “re-
fused invitations to lecture or attend conferences because they would 
not go through scores of humiliating questions and endless delays.”393 
As discussed in Part I, this concern has not entirely dissipated.394 More-
over, concerns regarding global terrorism may well exacerbate it. 
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 Writing at a time when fear of Communists was rampant, Chafee 
argued that differences in outlook or ideology were not proper bases 
for exclusion. “Indeed,” he wrote, “differences in outlook may have ad-
vantages when our purpose is to build up mutual understanding as a 
basis for trust and friendship and to increase our knowledge from what 
foreign travelers tell us.”395 According to Chafee, the only proper 
ground for denial of entry was that the alien posed a clear danger to 
the public safety.396 Then as now, temporary visitors armed only with 
words and ideas could be said to pose no clear and present danger to 
the nation’s security. 
 Unfortunately, this cosmopolitan attitude is not reflected in recent 
decisions like the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Holder v. Humanitar-
ian Law Project, or many older precedents that treat exchanges with for-
eigners as dangerous interactions rather than opportunities for dia-
logue.397 Further, as Part I notes, despite a statutory ban on ideological 
exclusions, legal and constitutional uncertainty with regard to the ex-
ecutive’s power to engage in ideological exclusion persists.398 
 In an appropriate case, the Supreme Court ought to expressly 
hold that ideology, belief, and association do not constitute “facially 
valid and bona fide” reasons for visa denials and other forms of alien 
exclusion. Some might object that this is a form of unilateral disarma-
ment by the United States, or an improper limitation on the sovereign’s 
authority to control its borders. It is neither. It is certainly true that the 
United States is not the only nation that has restricted ingress based 
solely on ideas, thoughts, and associations. The United States, however, 
frequently takes the official position that its speech guarantees are 
broader and, on that basis, preferable to those of other nations. As not-
ed, like other nations, the United States is internationally committed to 
freedom of movement and the free cross-border flow of information.399 
Rejecting ideological exclusion would not prevent officials from deny-
ing ingress to aliens who pose a danger to public safety or national se-
curity that is unrelated to their speech, associations, or beliefs. In addi-
                                                                                                                      
395 Chafee, supra note 362, at 200. 
396 Id. at 201. 
397 See, e.g., 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) (upholding a prohibition on provision of “mate-
rial support” to foreign terrorist organizations); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 465 (1987) 
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certain registration, filing, and disclosure requirements prior to distributing foreign propa-
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398 See supra notes 45–77 and accompanying text. 
399 See supra notes 350–356 and accompanying text. 
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tion to reaping the benefits that ingress of foreign visitors would pro-
vide, a clear rejection of ideological exclusions would demonstrate that 
our people have nothing to fear from a foreign visitor who merely in-
tends to speak and associate with audiences in the United States. 
 Cross-border travel, information-gathering, and “commingling” are 
not mere luxuries for the leisure class or the concern of a few foreign 
academics wishing to enter the United States. Particularly in a globalized 
era that revolves around international contacts and collaborations, the 
interests and concerns of “gregarious man” extend beyond U.S. territo-
rial borders. 
2. Freedom of Information, Association, and Belief Without Regard to 
Frontiers 
 As Justice Marshall wrote in his Mandel dissent, “[t]he progress of 
knowledge is an international venture.”400 In a globalized era, it is criti-
cal that the First Amendment be interpreted and enforced in a manner 
that protects and facilitates robust liberties to impart and to receive in-
formation across borders. Freedom of movement across borders is only 
one aspect of this concern. 
 As noted, the United States and other signatories of human rights 
covenants formally recognize rights to the free flow of information and 
belief without regard to frontiers.401 Nevertheless, current First Amend-  
ment jurisprudence does not extend robust protection to these rights. 
In this regard, the Court’s 1965 decision in Lamont v. Postmaster General 
to invalidate a prior restraint on receipt of foreign propaganda is criti-
cal.402 Or at least it might be, if it were to be interpreted broadly to 
commit the United States, both domestically and internationally, to fa-
cilitating the free cross-border flow of information. As noted in Part I, 
however, neither Lamont nor any subsequent decision makes such a 
strong statement. 
 Lee Bollinger has recently suggested that with regard to freedom 
of the press, we need an affirmative judicial statement that shifts the 
discussion “from the constitutional paradigm of a national public fo-
rum to a global one.”403 He contends that we need a New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan for the twenty-first century.404 That would certainly benefit 
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the institutional press and the citizen press, particularly as they seek 
access to places and sources abroad. Depending on how such a decision 
is crafted, it might, as Sullivan has over the years, produce benefits for 
broader categories of speakers and speech. 
 What is really needed, however, is a Lamont for the twenty-first cen-
tury. We need a decision that offers clear and robust protection for 
cross-border information flow and international relationships. That 
decision ought to characterize cross-border political, artistic, cultural, 
and religious information flow as core First Amendment concerns. 
Moreover, it ought to confirm that the Free Speech Clause applies not 
only to citizens’ receipt of foreign materials and information, but also 
to communications from citizens to foreign audiences (whether consist-
ing solely of aliens or a mix of citizens and aliens). In an era of global-
ization and mass cross-border communications, these should no longer 
be considered open questions. 
 A more cosmopolitan interpretation of the First Amendment 
would lead to invalidation or repeal of certain antiquated prohibitions 
and restrictions on cross-border communication. Among the measures 
discussed in Part I, this would include the Logan Act, an eighteenth 
century relic that purports to criminally proscribe citizens’ communica-
tions with foreign governments and principals;405 FARA’s political 
propaganda regulations, which burden distribution of foreign political 
speech inside the United States;406 and certain provisions of the Smith-
Mundt Act that limit domestic receipt and dissemination of U.S. for-
eign propaganda messages.407 All of these restrictions unduly interfere 
with cross-border information flow and are based upon the provincial 
notions that citizens have no legitimate interest in participating in 
global political dialogue, that all foreign propaganda is dangerous, and 
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that citizens need to be paternalistically shielded from their own gov-
ernment’s propaganda. 
 The First Amendment ought to be interpreted such that it protects 
the rights of citizens to speak to and associate with aliens located 
abroad. Courts should reject the argument that these contacts are a 
form of mere conduct beyond the protection of the First Amendment. 
Of course, like other rights, the right to enter cross-border expressive 
relationships must be balanced against foreign policy, national security, 
and other federal interests. Citizens ought not, however, lose basic First 
Amendment protections owing to the mere fact that certain officially 
disfavored foreign persons or organizations are involved in the rela-
tionship. We ought to avoid repeating the mistakes of our past by not 
treating association with foreign organizations as automatically depriv-
ing citizens of full First Amendment protections. 
 In this respect, the Supreme Court’s decision in Humanitarian Law 
Project is particularly troubling. The decision has the potential to jeop-
ardize a wide range of pure speech that may be “coordinated” with for-
eign terrorist organizations.408 The criminalization of peaceful and le-
gal speech that is coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations is 
inconsistent with both traditional and cosmopolitan free speech prin-
ciples favoring open interaction and dialogue across borders.409 At the 
very least, Congress ought to amend the material assistance laws to clar-
ify the types of communications that are banned and to require that the 
government prove that such communications were undertaken with 
the intent to further the terrorist activities of the organizations.410 
 Finally, under a more cosmopolitan interpretation of the First 
Amendment, officials ought to facilitate, or at least refrain from interfer-
ing with, the speech and other liberties of foreign nationals residing on 
U.S. soil. At a minimum, aliens ought not to be subject to expulsion ow-
ing solely to their speech, associations, or beliefs. Foreign press lawfully 
in the United States ought to be granted the same rights of access to 
events and proceedings that are otherwise granted to the domestic press 
and the public.411 Congress should consider abolishing or amending 
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the “deemed export” rule that restricts the distribution of lawful mate-
rial to foreign nationals in the United States based on the mere possibil-
ity that an alien might do something unlawful with the information.412 
Under a cosmopolitan approach, we cannot say that foreign nationals, 
whether living in the United States or abroad, have no cognizable inter-
est in the outcome of many U.S. elections. Thus, any court presented 
with a justiciable claim ought to carefully consider whether the flat ban 
on contributions by foreign nationals in U.S. campaigns is adequately 
tailored to address demonstrable governmental concerns relating to 
foreign influences in such campaigns.413 
                                                                                                                     
3. The Portability of First Amendment Rights and Obligations 
 As citizens, speech, press, and U.S. power have become more in-
ternationally dispersed, the question whether the First Amendment 
“follows the flag” has become an increasingly salient one. Portability of 
both rights and governmental obligations is a key aspect of First 
Amendment cosmopolitanism. To fully participate in global conversa-
tions and relationships, citizens must enjoy extraterritorial protection 
with regard to their expressive and religious liberties. This is a concern 
for a large category of citizens, including diplomats abroad, military 
personnel, citizen protesters, and citizens involved in peace-building 
efforts in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.414 Moreover, as discussed in 
Part I, global exercises of U.S. power can impact the expressive and re-
ligious liberties of aliens abroad.415 At present, it is not clear whether 
(1) speakers, press members, and other actors possess First Amend-
ment rights abroad; (2) the First Amendment’s protections attach to 
speech that moves in international channels (whether via the Internet 
or otherwise); (3) religious neutrality and anti-establishment principles 
have any extraterritorial force; or (4) aliens are entitled to any First 
Amendment protections. 
 The basic theories regarding the extraterritorial domain of the Bill 
of Rights and other provisions—i.e., universalism, global due process, 
membership, and mutuality of obligation—have been much discussed 
in judicial decisions and academic literature.416 There has been little 
 
412 See supra notes 115–119 and accompanying text. 
413 See supra notes 316–320 and accompanying text. 
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415 See supra notes 238–257 and accompanying text. 
416 See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 340; Neuman, supra note 230, at 285. 
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judicial or academic analysis, however, of how these approaches relate 
specifically to the First Amendment.417 The approach to extraterritorial 
scope or domain that best comports with the values and principles of 
First Amendment cosmopolitanism is the mutuality of obligation ap-
proach that is perhaps most closely identified with Gerald Neuman. As 
Neuman has explained, the mutuality approach might be described as 
“identifying a sphere in which a nation’s law operates, which was once 
defined in geographical terms but now is viewed more broadly.”418 Un-
der a mutuality approach, citizens are always considered to be subject 
to U.S. law, wherever located, and thus entitled to First Amendment 
protections.419 Aliens, as Neuman has explained, “are within the sphere 
either when they are within the nation’s territory or on specific occa-
sions when the nation attempts to extract obedience to its laws.”420 Al-
though I will refine and expand upon the mutuality approach in cer-
tain respects in order to tailor it to First Amendment concerns, it is a 
satisfactory foundation for the principle of portability. 
 With regard to citizens, although the Supreme Court has never 
expressly so held, it appears to be well accepted that they enjoy rights 
against federal action in foreign countries.421 So it is something of a 
mystery that courts have felt constrained to assume rather than hold 
that citizens formally possess First Amendment rights abroad, that the 
Free Speech Clause applies extraterritorially to citizens’ speech that is 
distributed abroad, and that the religious liberties of citizens are gener-
ally protected abroad.422 There is no reason to hesitate in holding that 
the First Amendment’s domain extends to citizens living and working 
abroad. That does not mean that expressive and religious protections 
apply in precisely the same manner half a world away as they do at 
home. Nevertheless, insofar as practicable, citizens ought to enjoy First 
Amendment protections regardless of borders or frontiers. Like the 
rights to travel and to contribute to cross-border information flow, such 
rights would have to be balanced against national interests rather than 
automatically subjugated to them. 
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 Mutuality of obligation is a general approach to constitutional 
domain. Portability of First Amendment liberties, in particular, would 
rest as well upon more specific justifications. It is not simply a matter of 
receiving the benefits of obedience to U.S. law. One of the goals of First 
Amendment cosmopolitanism is to protect and encourage commin-
gling and cross-cultural exchange. Rights portability would provide as-
surance to citizens engaged in foreign travel and inquiry, the cross-
border sharing of information and ideas, and global collaboration, that 
their First Amendment rights have not been waived or otherwise jeop-
ardized as a result of crossing international borders. 
 Moreover, as the world continues to shrink, domestic speech will 
increasingly appear in foreign marketplaces. Without some positive as-
surance that speech published or republished abroad remains pro-
tected by the First Amendment, domestic speakers may be discouraged 
from participating in global forums and marketplaces of ideas and may 
institute technological and other measures to sharply limit distribution 
of their speech to the safe haven of the domestic United States. First 
Amendment portability would thus require that speech that either orig-
inates domestically and “travels” abroad, or is published by a citizen 
abroad, retains its First Amendment protection. Courts ought to reject 
the notion that citizens may waive or abandon Free Speech Clause pro-
tections either by publishing material abroad that does not relate to any 
issue of public concern in the United States or intentionally targeting 
foreign audiences.423 So long as the United States has a discernible 
connection to the speech in question, the First Amendment ought to 
follow it through foreign channels of communication. 
 Armed with the assurance of portability, press members would also 
be able to confidently assert access and other rights in foreign loca-
tions, including perhaps at American detention centers at Guantanamo 
and abroad. This access could be critical to informing not just U.S. au-
diences, but global ones as well, about foreign conflicts in which the 
United States is a participant. 
 First Amendment portability would also affect religious liberties. 
Citizen-missionaries and others who work for religious institutions 
abroad would be entitled to protection against coercion or discrimina-
tion by U.S. officials operating in foreign nations. Further, insofar as 
the obligation to avoid official establishments of religion is deemed to 
be portable, U.S. citizens would gain some measure of confidence that 
anti-establishment principles will be respected even in foreign locations 
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where oversight is difficult or impossible and transparency is at a mini-
mum. 
 Finally, express recognition of the portability of citizens’ First 
Amendment rights would also produce important symbolic benefits. It 
would signify that the United States takes seriously international cove-
nants regarding the free flow of information without regard to fron-
tiers. As Lee Bollinger has recently observed, denying access rights to 
the U.S. press beyond U.S. borders “undermines the perception abroad 
of the U.S. commitment to a free and independent press, making 
America look the same as authoritarian regimes.”424 If the United 
States intends to continue to press for more open exchange of informa-
tion and religious freedom in authoritarian and other foreign regimes, 
it ought to afford its own citizens those liberties while they are abroad. 
                                                                                                                     
 The principle of portability with regard to aliens is a more compli-
cated matter. First Amendment cosmopolitanism does not envision that 
aliens would be entitled to First Amendment rights in all of their vari-
ous dealings with U.S. officials. In other words, cosmopolitanism does 
not entail universalism. As Gerald Neuman has observed, “the re-
quirements of religious and ideological neutrality read out of the 
speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment cannot be applied 
to all contexts of human interaction.”425 As he has noted, imposing free 
speech and free exercise constraints wherever the United States acts 
would “overburden the government by attempting to enforce in the 
broader context constraints chosen for the narrower one.”426 Universal 
extension of free speech and other rights to aliens might also produce 
dilution of constitutional guarantees at home, as limits imposed abroad 
may filter back “to undermine the original core.”427 
 This does not mean we are left with the provincial approach of 
granting no protection at all to aliens’ expressive and religious liberties. 
Under a mutuality of obligation approach, U.S. officials are at least ob-
ligated to comply with First Amendment commands insofar as aliens 
are within U.S. custody or inside American borders, “or when the na-
tion attempts to exact obedience to its laws.”428 Under this approach, 
the First Amendment would, at a minimum, be at home wherever the 
United States asserts its sovereignty in such a way that aliens’ expressive 
and religious liberties are directly and substantially affected. First 
 
424 Bollinger, supra note 297, at 121. 
425 Neuman, supra note 219, at 110–11. 
426 Id. at 111. 
427 Id. 
428 Id. at 109. 
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Amendment obligations would thus be portable insofar as the United 
States demands obedience to its laws, for example, when it detains, 
prosecutes or otherwise punishes aliens for expressive or religious ac-
tivities abroad. Even if general First Amendment standards regarding 
content neutrality and religious neutrality are not fully portable, offi-
cials ought to at least avoid purposeful censorship and suppression of 
aliens’ expression and beliefs when exercising sovereign power abroad. 
 Under First Amendment cosmopolitanism, U.S. mutuality obliga-
tions would be interpreted broadly. Alien speakers and religious leaders 
contribute to trans-border dialogues in which U.S. citizens are active 
participants. Some commentators implicitly acknowledge this contribu-
tion when they recognize that the Free Speech Clause is applicable to at 
least some alien-to-citizen speech.429 Particularly in light of the long-
standing U.S. commitment to facilitating and protecting participatory 
democracies abroad, the Free Speech Clause ought to extend to at least 
some alien-to-alien communications.430 As Jack Balkin has suggested, we 
ought to ensure that the First Amendment “protects the ability of indi-
viduals to participate in the culture in which they live and promotes the de-
velopment of a culture that is more democratic and participatory.”431 
 To consider one concrete example, U.S. funding and aid projects 
can have a profound impact on foreign expressive cultures. Under in-
ternational covenants regarding freedom of speech, information, and 
religion, it is important to ensure that this means of extending U.S. 
power abroad does not distort foreign speech marketplaces or foreign 
religious cultures. Aliens located abroad ought to be allowed to chal-
lenge U.S. funding conditions that purport to suppress even privately 
funded expression in foreign locations. Under a cosmopolitan interpre-
tation of mutuality and portability, such conditions constitute an exer-
cise of sovereign power. They present foreign speakers with a Hobson’s 
choice: either refuse critical U.S. funds and retain their speech rights 
abroad, or accept the funds and suffer suppression under a worldwide 
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gag rule. Respect for foreign speech cultures, which is discussed below, 
requires that officials refrain from imposing unconstitutional conditions 
even on foreign speakers.432 To protect against distortion of distant ex-
pressive and religious cultures, U.S. courts ought to treat alien standing 
in such cases more flexibly. They ought also to avoid limiting the First 
Amendment’s zone of interest by relying on inapposite immigration and 
travel cases.433 Further, under a cosmopolitan interpretation of the First 
Amendment, protection under the Free Exercise Clause ought to be 
afforded to aliens against purposeful interferences with religious beliefs 
or practices—even if the religious culture in which the alien participates 
is deemed to be offensive to Americans or U.S. officials.434 
 In some circumstances, aliens residing inside the United States 
ought to enjoy the benefits of First Amendment mutuality and portabil-
ity. For example, aliens who are subject to deportation ought to enjoy 
free speech and other First Amendment protections. Further, the Free 
Speech Clause ought to apply to aliens who are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of U.S. courts.435 American courts have no more power to suppress 
the speech rights of aliens by ordering them not to communicate with 
their own governments abroad than they have to deny American citi-
zens the right to petition Congress. 
 Consequently, under a cosmopolitan interpretation of mutuality, 
First Amendment rights and obligations would be considered generally 
portable with regard to citizens, and at least partially portable with re-
gard to aliens.436 
4. Respect for Foreign Speech and Religious Cultures 
 Application of the First Amendment in trans-border contexts will 
require heightened sensitivity to foreign expressive and religious cul-
tures. The provincial supposition that U.S. power operates in separate 
foreign and domestic spheres is in many cases incorrect, as many do-
mestic programs impact foreign expressive and religious cultures. In-
                                                                                                                      
432 See DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. V. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 308 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
433 See supra notes 78–103 and accompanying text. 
434 Mansfield, supra note 53, at 32. 
435 But cf. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 280, 287 
(D.D.C. 1984) (explaining that a U.S. tribunal is not “compelled by the First Amendment 
to protect an alien’s desire to speak in a foreign country”). 
436 Of course, the United States could, and I would argue should, voluntarily extend 
the First Amendment’s extraterritorial domain beyond these minimal standards of port-
ability. 
2011] The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective 1021 
deed, some U.S. programs and policies, including those requiring that 
favorable information about the United States be disseminated abroad, 
are specifically designed for this purpose. 
 Under a more cosmopolitan approach to the First Amendment, 
judges and public officials would be required to carefully consider, and 
where appropriate demonstrate respect for, foreign speech and reli-
gious cultures.437 Sensitivity to and respect for foreign cultures will af-
fect the expressive liberties of both citizens and aliens. Again, domestic 
and foreign speech marketplaces are increasingly interconnected. Offi-
cials ought to be mindful that U.S. spending conditions can impact 
both domestic and foreign NGOs and speech marketplaces.438 Simi-
larly, a decision by a U.S. court to deny Free Speech Clause protection 
to allegedly libelous domestic speech that has been republished abroad 
could substantially affect both domestic and foreign channels of com-
munication.439 
 Attention to foreign religious cultures will also impact the en-
forcement of the Establishment Clause where projects are funded 
abroad. One scholar has proposed that U.S. support for sectarian activi-
ties ought to be upheld so long as it does not violate the laws or consti-
tution of the foreign regime.440 This approach, however, takes respect 
for foreign cultures too far and jeopardizes the core principles of the 
Establishment Clause. 
 Lamont v. Woods applied a more plausible notion of respect when it 
recognized that foreign circumstances may provide a compelling reason 
for allowing the United States to channel funds to sectarian schools 
abroad—even if such funding would violate the Establishment Clause if 
the schools were located in the United States.441 As Woods properly rec-
ognized, a “mechanical” approach to establishment issues in foreign 
contexts is inappropriate.442 Respect for foreign church-state models or 
cultures may dictate reversal of the usual presumption of establishment 
                                                                                                                      
437 To accurately assess claims involving disparate but interconnected cultures, courts 
will need adequate information regarding how particular U.S. laws and policies affect for-
eign information markets. If they are to apply the Establishment Clause abroad, they will 
need information regarding foreign religious practices and cultures. This information will 
sometimes be difficult to obtain. Courts can, of course, require that litigants present fac-
tual information regarding these issues. They may also consult public reports, and will 
likely benefit from amicus briefs filed by foreign NGOs and other interested parties. 
438 See DKT, 887 F.2d at 308 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
439 See Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 677. 
440 See Mansfield, supra note 53, at 25–26. 
441 948 F.2d 825, 841–42 (2d Cir. 1991). 
442 See id. at 842. 
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in direct funding cases.443 Thus, for example, if the grantee is the only 
practically available channel for the aid, or “a given country has no secu-
lar educational system at all,” then the grant may be allowed.444 This in-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause would preserve the core anti-
establishment principle while showing respect for the foreign religious 
cultures in which U.S. funding and other activities take place.445 The 
approach may raise some concerns regarding dilution of domestic Es-
tablishment Clause principles and doctrines. Courts must require that 
the circumstances be truly extraordinary in order to alter the usual rules 
and presumptions regarding state support for sectarian projects and 
missions. 
 A modality or approach to foreign cultures that is based upon prin-
ciples of understanding and respect will not impose a constitutional or 
cultural relativism beyond U.S. borders. Nor will it lead to the supplant-
ing of domestic speech and religious standards in favor of foreign alter-
natives. Rather, the approach is fundamentally grounded upon the rec-
ognition that U.S. policies and powers increasingly affect both foreign 
and domestic institutions and cultures. A more cosmopolitan interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment would protect core First Amendment 
speech and religious liberties, while at the same time showing appropri-
ate awareness of and respect for foreign expressive and religious cul-
tures. 
C. Beyond Individual Liberties 
 Although this Article has focused on the effects a cosmopolitan 
turn might have on the recognition and enforcement of particular First 
Amendment liberties—i.e., the right to travel, to report from foreign 
locations, and to freely practice religious beliefs regardless of loca-
tion—cosmopolitanism has much broader implications. Indeed, the 
core values and principles of First Amendment cosmopolitanism could 
inform or affect a range of issues far beyond the realm of individual 
liberties. There is only limited space here to identify some of these 
broader concerns. 
                                                                                                                      
443 Id. 
444 See id.; see also Mansfield, supra note 53, at 34 (urging a flexible interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause based on “respect for the ways of other nations”). 
445 There are obviously a host of issues that would need to be worked out in applying 
the establishment principle in foreign contexts. For example, what if any role would con-
cerns regarding psychological coercion play in school contexts abroad? Is the “reasonable 
observer,” which we may assume to be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, deemed 
to have knowledge of foreign religious cultures? 
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 For example, American foreign policy with regard to repressive re-
gimes abroad is a work in progress. There may be an inclination to pun-
ish and isolate such regimes. First Amendment cosmopolitanism, how-
ever, might point in a different direction. Officials, with the cooperation 
of technology companies, might seek to enable citizens in such regimes 
to participate in global dialogue by facilitating their access to new tech-
nologies.446 Indeed, global access to new technologies might become a 
formal plank in U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, First Amendment cos-
mopolitanism could inform current debates regarding the proper role 
of states, localities, and private actors in the foreign affairs realm. In a 
globalized society, questions of who may properly participate in global 
debates are likely to become increasingly important. First Amendment 
cosmopolitanism suggests that sub-national and other actors ought to be 
invited to participate in robust foreign affairs forums in which a diversity 
of views are presented.447 
 In the domestic sphere, cosmopolitan values and principles could 
help shape American policies regarding global access to the Internet 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights at home and abroad. 
Officials will have to determine the extent to which they can and should 
export First Amendment standards and values through Internet access 
controls and other mechanisms. As recent controversies regarding en-
forcement of foreign libel judgments and Sharia principles demon-
strate, officials will also need to develop a coherent approach to assimi-
lation or rejection of foreign expressive and religious standards.448 First 
Amendment cosmopolitanism, based in part upon international com-
mitments to freedom of information, press, and religion without regard 
to borders, may offer a workable framework for resolving such issues. 
 The First Amendment’s intersection with territorial borders is dy-
namic and rapidly changing. As that relationship evolves, we will have to 
resolve some old as well as new and presently unanticipated questions. 
                                                                                                                      
446 Mark Landler, Google Searches for a Foreign Policy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2010, at WK4. 
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Conclusion 
 In a globalized and digitized era, many Americans probably take for 
granted that the First Amendment protects their ability to travel abroad, 
speak to and collaborate with aliens abroad, report from foreign loca-
tions, and participate in expressive and religious activities abroad. In 
fact, the First Amendment’s trans-border dimension remains surpris-
ingly under-developed. The traditional orientation with respect to First 
Amendment liberties can be described as provincial. The basic assump-
tion seems to be that the First Amendment consists of a set of restric-
tions on domestic governance with regard to expressive and religious 
liberties. 
 This Article has offered a critique of provincialism, and an alterna-
tive orientation with respect to the First Amendment’s trans-border di-
mension. The Article has labeled this outlook “cosmopolitan.” The la-
bel is less important than the ideal, which is to move cross-border and 
beyond-border concerns closer to the core than to the periphery of our 
contemporary First Amendment. A twenty-first century account of the 
First Amendment’s trans-border dimension must acknowledge the 
blurring of territorial boundaries, changing notions of territorial sover-
eignty, the influence of international cooperation and commitments, 
and the impact of digitization on expressive and religious liberties. As 
we advance further into a globalized and digitized era in which expres-
sive and religious activities transcend territorial borders, we will need to 
clarify the contours of the First Amendment’s trans-border dimension. 
As citizens, we need to know to what extent expressive and religious 
liberties survive the crossing of territorial borders. Public officials who 
are making or implementing federal policy abroad also require greater 
clarity with regard to the First Amendment’s regulatory domain. 
 Largely as a result of the interpretations and policies of the political 
branches, the First Amendment is presently more cosmopolitan than it 
was in the mid-twentieth century. What is missing, however, is a firmer 
jurisprudential foundation that will facilitate formal recognition and 
enforcement of trans-border First Amendment rights. Cosmopolitan 
principles of free movement, liberal cross-border information flow, 
portability of rights and obligations, and respect for foreign cultures 
would transform the First Amendment’s trans-border dimension in a 
manner that facilitates global dialogue, advances citizen self-governance, 
and increases personal autonomy. These principles would also place 
some limits on the extraterritorial regulation of citizens’ and aliens’ ex-
pressive and religious activities. In short, cosmopolitanism would at last 
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treat trans-border liberties as serious and significant First Amendment 
concerns. 
 This Article has offered a jurisprudential blueprint for a more 
cosmopolitan First Amendment. Some powerful forces, including isola-
tionism, nativism, and longstanding principles of official provincialism 
are arrayed against this orientation. If the experience of the twentieth 
century is any guide, though, some equally powerful forces are likely to 
push the First Amendment in a more cosmopolitan direction in the 
twenty-first century. 
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